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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a
corporation; KENNECOTT COMMUNICAT I 0 NS CORPORATION, a corporation;
BEAR CREEK MINING COMP ANY, a
corporation; KENNECOTT COAL C 0 M PANY, a corporation; CHASE BRASS AND
COPPER COMPANY, INC., a corporation;
PEABODY COAL COMPANY (formerly
KENBODY, INC.), a corporation,
vs.

Case No.
12498

Plaintiffs,

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF KENNECOTT COPPER
CORPORATION AND
AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs herein, pursuant to a Writ of Review issued
by this court under date of April 29, 1971, seek to _have
this court review the lawfulness of a decision of the Utah
State Tax Commission which assessed additional franchise taxes against plaintiffs for the years 1967 and 1968
in the amount of $2,313,507.72.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE
TAX COMMISSION
The Tax Commission, in its decision of April 5, 1971,
assessed a deficiency against Kennecott Copper Corporation and its affiliated corporations in the total amount of
$2,313,507.72 (including interest at 6% to May 15, 1971).
With one minor exception regarding mine depletion, this
constituted a complete approval of a deficiency assessment
which had previously been prepared and served by the
auditing division of the Utah State Tax Commission.
STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek review by this court to determine the
lawfulness of the decision of the State Tax Commission,
and specifically ask this court to reverse the decision of
the State Tax Commission, in whole or in part, to the
extent it is determined by this court that said decision
is contrary to law or unsupported by facts.
THE FACTS

Introductory Statement
The facts before this court were established before
the Tax Commission by way of stipulation (Tr. 40-42), *
by way of testimony (Tr. 77-449, Vols. I and II), and by
way of exhibits in connection with said testimony.
A. Organization and Operations of Kennecott Copper Corporation and Its Subsidiaries.
*Transcript references refer to the official record as certified to this
Court and as re-paginated by the Tax Commission.

Kennecott Copper Corporation is a parent corporation which, in addition to its own operations, has approximately thirty (30) wholly-owned subsidiary corporations
(Tr. 108), which operate all over the world (Tr. 108).
Kennecott filed a consolidated federal income tax return
for these companies, to the extent that they are U. S.
corporations. This group is referred to hereinafter as
the "Federal Consolidated Group" (Tr. 109).
Since Utah law only allows the filing of consolidated
returns for affiliate corporations which are, in fact, doing
business within the State of Utah, most of the thirty-odd
corporations comprising the Federal Consolidated Group
are irrelevant to the franchise tax issues presented in this
case. The case involves only the so-called "Utah Consolidated Group", consisting of several corporations which, in
fact, do business in the State of Utah, including Kennecott
Copper Corporation itself, Kennecott Communications
Corporation, Bear Creek Mining Company, Peabody Coal
Company (formerly Kenbody, Inc.), Kennecott Coal Corporation and Chase Brass and Copper Company, Inc.
In order that the court may have a better understanding of the basic operations and organization of the
company, we are setting forth on the following page an
organization chart. This was prepared from Exhibit "H",
pages 1, 2, and 3 (Tr. 623-25). Reference will be made
to the various numbers on the chart in the following
textual explanation.
It may be seen from the chart that the principal executives of the Kennecott family are the Board of Directors

CHART I.
Board of Directors (1)

s

T

A
F

President and Chief
Executive Officer (2)

V.P.

Technology (3)

President, Quebec
Iron & Titanium (9)

Gen. Mgr., Chino
Mines Operations
(13)

V.P.

Exploration (4)

Gen. Counsel and
Secretary (5)

v. P.

Finance (6)

President, Metal
Mining Division (10)

Gen. Mgr., Nevada
Mines Operations

(14)

F

V.P.

Presicent, Chase
· Brass & Copper (11)

Gen. Mgr., Ray
Mines Operations
(15)

V.P.

Planning (7)

Administration (8)

Chairman of the BoarJ,
Peabody Coal (12)

Gen. Mgr., Utah
Copper Operations
(16)

Refinery I\lgr.,
Kennecoti
Refining Corp. ( 17)

L
Mine Superintendent,
Tintic Operations (18)

I------'
N
E
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(1), and the President and Chief Executive Officer (2).
It may be seen from the chart that the basic staff func-

tions, including technology, exploration, finance, etc., have
been centralized, and service the entire corporation. (See
Nos. 3 through 8 inclusive.) On a line level, there are four
major profit centers (Nos. 9 through 12 inclusive). Quebec
Iron and Titanium (No. 9) is not relevant to this case inasmuch as this is a separate foreign corporation, of which
two-thirds (2/3) is owned by Kennecott. This corporation does not do business in the State of Utah and was
not, therefore, included in the franchise tax returns. The
Metal Mining Division (See No. 10) consists of various
divisions within the parent corporation itself, with the exception of Kennecott Refining Corporation (No. 17),
which is a separate corporation and was, therefore, not
involved in the computations for the returns in question
since that corporation does not do business in the State
of Utah. The other two line organizations, Chase (No.
11) and Peabody (No. 12), are separate corporations,
wholly owned by Kennecott, which do business in the
State of Utah, and which were, therefore, included in the
returns as filed.
Within the Metal Mining Division itself, excluding
Kennecott Refining Corporation, there are five (5) basic
mining operations, including Chino Mines in New Mexico,
Nevada Mines, Ray Mines in Arizona, and the TJtah Copper operations and Tintic operations, both of which are
physically located in the State of Utah. More specifically,
the Utah Copper operation includes the onm. pit mine at

Bingham Canyon, Utah, and the various activities performed in Utah following mining, including leaching, precipitation, rail and truck haulage, milling, concentrating,
smelting and refining (Tr. 112). Also located in Utah is
the Tintic Division at Eureka, which is a lead-zinc mine.
Chino, Nevada and Ray are all open pit copper mines
which, with some exceptions, have similar post-mining
operations as in Utah (Tr. 112). Kennecott has its general headquarters in the State of New York. Mr. R. L.
Ward, Comptroller for the Corporation, described the extent and nature of these operations in his testimony (Tr.
110, et seq.), He pointed out that there are approximately
four hundred employees in New York with total salaries
of $3.7 million in 1967 and $4.8 million in 1968 (Tr. 111)
all of whom are basically devoted to centralized management, control, supervision and the rendition of centralized
services to the operating areas of the Company (Tr. 111).
In addition to the basic operating properties of the
company, there are numerous facilities which perform
centralized service functions (Tr. 113). Briefly, these include:

The Metal Mining Division Engineering Department which performs engineering services for various
subsidiaries, as well as operating properties within the
Metal Mining Division, such as Chino, Ray, Utah and
Nevada (Tr. 113-14). This group is located in the research center at the University of Utah, has approximately 75 employees, and reports directly to the President
of the Metal Mining Division in New York City with no
(a)
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administrative tie-in to the Utah Copper Division (Tr.
113-14).
(b) Kennecott Research Center is located at the
research center at the University of Utah, employs approximately 140 people and performs basic research in the
field of extractive metallurgy for various Kennecott divisions and subsidiaries. (See Tr. 221 for specific examples.)
The director of this group reports directly to the President of the Metal Mining Division in New York and there
is no administrative tie-in with the Utah Copper Division.
(c) The Western Data Center is a computer installation with basic facilities and headquarters in Salt Lake
City, Utah, which performs computer accounting services
for the four (4) western copper properties, Tintic Division, Ozark Lead, and others. Its director reports to the
Vice-President of Finance in New York and it has no administrative tie-in with the Utah Copper Division (Tr.
115).
( d) The Scientific and Engineering Computer Center is headquartered in Salt Lake City, but has no administrative connection with the Utah Copper Division.
The director of this group reports directly to the President of the Metal Mining Division in New York. This
group performs various computer services of a scientific
nature for the Company's divisions and subsidiaries as
set forth more specifically in the testimony (Tr. 115-16).

(e) Kennecott Exploration Services Group is headquartered in a separate building in Salt Lake City and
performs geochemical and geophysical research and opera-
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tions (Tr. 116). The director of this group, which has no
administrative relationship to Utah Copper Division,
reports to the Vice-President of Exploration in New York
(Tr. 116).
(f) Ledgemont Laboratory is a research facility in
Massachusetts which is referred to as the corporate research development facility (Tr. 116). This work is performed both for the various operating divisions within
the Company and its subsidiaries.
(g) Other groups include the Operating Properties
Division headquartered in Salt Lake City which performs
ore research and slope stability studies, (Tr. 117) Eastern
Data Center which performs computer services for various
groups, including the operating division and its subsidiaries, (Tr. 117) and the Financial Analysis Group in New
York (Tr. 117).
Substantial evidence was presented at the hearing
by plaintiffs to demonstrate the extensive central controls
exercised by the New York headquarters over the various
operating divisions and subsidiaries of the Company, including the Utah Copper Division. Since the Tax Commission found that the Company was "unitary", we do
not deem it appropriate to set forth that evidence in great
detail, but will simply indicate the general areas covered
in the testimony.

Vertical Relationship
Mr. R. L. Ward, Comptroller of Kennecott, outlined
the strong vertical relationship and central control in

9

areas as: fiscal control (Tr. 128); financing (Tr. 129,
Exhibit H-3, Tr. 625); centralized functional control of
accounting (Tr. 131); tax policies and preparation of tax
returns (Tr. 133-34); centralized purchasing and purchasing control (Tr. 134-39, Exhibit H-6, Tr. 640); expenditure for capital equipment (Tr. 138) ; dispoeal of
property (Tr. 139); industrial and personnel relations
(Tr. 140-43); fringe benefits, insurance, savings and benefit programs (Tr. 143-45); product advertising (Tr. 14748) ; the hiring of independent professional services such
as legal and medical services (Tr. 148-49); transportation
management throughout the Company (Tr. 149-50); auditing functions (Tr. 151-53); communications network
throughout the Company, including mail, teletype, wide
area telephone service, and various publications (Tr. 15355, Exhibit H-5, Tr. 612); financial analysis (Tr. 155-56);
sales and traffic (Tr. 156-57); warehouse functions (Tr.
157); written procedures and controls (Tr. 158-60), and
policies and controls with respect to charitable contributions (Tr. 160).
Horizontal Relationship
Plaintiff also presented detailed and specific evidence
as to how the various activities in Utah, including but in
no way limited to the Utah Copper Division, contributed
to, and were dependent upon, those activities outside
the State of Utah. In this connection, the vru.ious service
groups, such as the Research Center, Metal Mining Division, Engineering Department, Exploration Services, and
the Computer Group, were shown to malrn substantial
contributions to operations of the Company outside the
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State of Utah (Tr. 221-31). In addition to demonstrating
the unitary nature of the Kennecott operation, this evidence provides a graphic demonstration of the fairness
of the three part formula (to be discussed in greater detail in POINT I infra) , for the contributions of these service organizations to the total Kennecott enterprise are
adequately and fairly reflected in the millions of dollars
they contribute to the numerator portion of the formula
which allocates taxable income to Utah (Tr. 223-28). An
excellent example of this is the Exploration Services Group
which, because of its presence in Utah adds $1.5 to $2
million to the numerator portion of the payroll and property fraction, but performs virtually no work in the State
of Utah or for the Utah Copper Division (Tr. 229).
Conversely, there are numerous staff functions outside
the State of Utah which perform services which directly
benefit either the Utah Copper Division or other operation of the Company located within the state. This
includes such activities as the Ledgemont Laboratory
(Tr. 230) and the wide variety of central services described by Mr. Ward and set out above.
Additionally, evidence demonstrates a substantial
flow of products among the various divisions and/or subsidiaries (Tr. 231-35, Exhibit J-3, Tr. 649-51). This includes such items as shipment of copper shapes to
Chase Brass (Tr. 231), shipment of blister and anode
copper to Kennecott Refining Corporation (Tr. 232),
treatment of slimes by Utah for the Ray Mines Division
in Nevada (Tr. 233), concentration of Chino molybdic oxide concentrates at Utah (Tr. 233). Likewise, services are
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performed for Utah Copper Division by other groups outside the State of Utah (Tr. 233, et seq., Exhibit J-4).
For example, concentrates are shipped to Nevada for
smelting (Tr. 234). Anodes are shipped to Kennecott
Refining Corporation for refining (Tr. 234).
On other levels, there is a definite and continuous
exchange of expertise between the various operating properties, (Tr. 235-37) and exchange of personnel between
the various divisions and subsidiaries (Tr. 237-39), and
exchange of equipment between the various divisions (Tr.
240).

Historical Developments in the Operation of the
Utah Copper Division
Evidence was also produced to demonstrate that over
the years the tendency of the Utah Copper Division has
been toward more complete integration with the other
operations of the Company. In 1935, the Utah Copper
Company was a separate corporation which, in that year,
was acquired by Kennecott (Tr. 241). The development,
according to Mr. 0. C. Madsen, Comptroller of the Utah
Copper Division, has been one from "complete autonomy
at the time of the acquisition to one by 1967 and at the
present of complete integration". Numerous physical
changes have been instituted as the exhibits (J-5, Tr.
651, Tr. 241-43) indicate, and there has been a continuing centralization in the use of centralized computer groups, research centers, exploration services,
etc. (Tr. 244). In addition, over the years the controls
exercised by New York over the Utah Copper Division
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have substantially increased. At one time, for example,
obtaining funds for capital improvements was a relatively
informal process, whereas today it involves substantial
justifications, financial analysis and a very sophisticated
program of evaluation (Tr. 245). Functional control of
accounting was instituted in September of 1956 (Tr. 246),
and centralized purchasing is a relatively new innovation
(Tr. 246).
A well documented conclusion was reached by Mr.
Madsen:
"I would say that to characterize the operations
of Kennecott in Utah as being in any way separate,
from those outside the State, would be in my opinion, totally incorrect. It is all part of a big overall
operation. Now in the first place, there is a very
close relationship as I mentioned to you earlier, a
continuous relationship with New York through
centralized purchasing, centralized accounting and
various other controls of a centralized function or
nature. In the second place, there is a definite
horizontal relationship between the Utah Copper
Division and the other mining properties of the
Company. In a sense, it might be termed an interdependent or symbiotic relationship. We perform services for them and they perform services
for us. We have an exchange of expertise. We depend on one another and contribute to one another
in many ways, in many respects, both in terms of
the flow of the product, the flow of expertise, the
services performed, and otherwise. . . . This is a
big overall operation" (Tr. 252-53).
B.

The Returns as Filed.

The "Utah Consolidated Group" filed its 1967 and
1968 francise tax returns in strict accordance with ap-
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plicable Utah law. As pertinent here, the general approach
of the returns was as follows:
(1) Consolidated Returns - The returns as filed
were consolidated returns, wherein the single taxpayer
was the group itself and corporate lines were disregarded.
The "consolidated net income" of the group was computed
in accordance with the Tax Commission's Regulation
4 (12) which requires the aggregated deductions of the
parent and its affiliates to be subtracted from the aggregated gross income, resulting in consolidated net income
which equals the overall net income of all members of
the group regardless of where earned. Certain inter-company transactions were eliminated or adjusted as the law
provides.
(2) Allocation - The consolidated net income of
the group was then allocated to the State of Utah through
the use of the three part statutory formula prescribed
by the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act,
Sections 59-13-78 through 97 inclusive, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (hereinafter called the "Uniform Act" or the
U.D.I.T.P.A.) which was adopted in Utah effective January 1, 1967.
The general method utilized is to compute a percentage based upon the average of three (3) factors - property, payroll and sales, and to multiply that percentage
times the consolidated net income, which yields a result
which could accurately be described as consolidated net
income allocated to Utah.
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C.

The Deficiency Assessment.

The auditing division of the Tax Commission in due
course served a deficiency assessment upon the taxpayer,
which differed quite substantially in its approach from the
returns. In general, the assessment was arrived at via the
following approach:
(a) Consolidation - The assessment in substance
and effect "unconsolidated" the returns by treating each
affiliated corporation as a separate entity, and separately
computing, for each such entity, corporate (as opposed
to consolidated) net income.
(b) Carving Out the Utah Copper Division - In
the case of the parent, Kennecott Copper Corporation, the
auditing division disregarded the Company as a whole
and eliminated all reference to or significance of any and
all operations except for certain segments of the corporation, Utah Copper Division and Tintic Division. Thus, the
New York, Chino, Ray and Nevada segments were simply
eliminated, as were all other company facilities and operations not located in Utah. In effect, the Kennecott
corporate entity was totally disregarded. The auditing
division treated the Utah Copper Division and Tintic Division as separate entities, separately subject to taxation,
as if they, not Kennecott Copper Corporation, had secured the corporation franchise from Utah to do business
in that state.
(c) Allocation - Still disregarding the taxpayer's
election to file a consolidated return, the auditing divi-
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sion sepurutely allocated corporate income of each of the
affiliates to Utah using a separate allocation formula for
each. In the case of the Utah Copper Division, the auditing
division applied what can best be described as a bastardized hybrid between separate accounting and the threepart formula. The auditing division started with an
alleged net income figure from the Utah Copper Division
(which would constitute a separate accounting technique)
and then applied a three-part formula to that amount
using only the property, payroll and sales of the Utah
Copper Division. The net result was to arrive at an allocation figure of approximately 66% for the Utah Copper
Division based upon property (100%), payroll (100%),
sales (0%), all divided by three (3). The auditing division also used this hybrid method with respect to Tintic.

D. A Comparison Between the Return and the Deficiency.
So that the court may more clearly discern the basic
issues between the parties, we set forth two illustrative
diagrams showing the differing approaches used by the respective parties.
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TAX COMMISSION'S METHOD

CORPORATIOl·J A

CORPOi1iHION B

CORPORATION C

DIVISIONAL INCOME
1-1 DEDUCTIONS

GROSS INCOME
I- I DEDUCTIONS

GROSS INCOME
(-)DEDUCTIONS

SEPARATE ACCOUNTING
INCOME FIGURE

CORPORATE NET
INCOME

CORPORATE NET
INCOME

*

*

*

( x) 3-PART FORMULA
(USING DIVISION
FACTORS ONLY)

Ix I 3-PART FORMULA
(USING CORP_ B.
FACTORS ONLY)

( x I 3-PART FORMULA
(USING CORP. C_
FACTORS ONLY)

ALLOCATED DIVISION
INCOME

ALLOCATED CORPORATE
INCOME

ALLOCATED CORPORATE
INCOME

TOTAL ALLOCATED
INCOME
(x)6%

TOTAL TAX

CHART Ill
TAXPAYER'S METHOD
CORPORATION B
CORPORATION C

CORPORATION A
GROSS
INCOME

+

DEDUCTIONS

+

GROSS
INCOME

DEDUCTIONS

+

GROSS
INCOME

AGGREGATED
GROSS
INCOME

+

DEDUCTIONS

( - I AGGREGATED
DEDUCTIONS
CONSOLI DATED
NET

ALL f'ROPERTY OF ABC IN UTAH
ALL p R0 p ER T_Y_O_F_A_6_C_E_v_E_R_Y1_v_H_ER_E_ _ _ _ x%
OF ABC IN UTAH

l-_____

OF ABC EVERYWHERE

A_L_L-SA_L_E_S_O_F_A_B_C_lr_•_U_T_A_H_ _ _ _ _
ALL SALES OF ABC EVERYWHERE
_

y%

x%+y%+z%

3

( x I APPORTIONMENT
PERCENTAGE
CONSOLIDATED
INCOME
ALLOCATED TO UTAH

( x 16%

t

TOTAL TAX

18

E. The Hearing and Tax Commission Decision.
A formal hearing was held in November of 1970 during
which each side was given a full opportunity to present
pertinent evidence. Taxpayer presented four (4) witnesses: R. L. Ward, Comptroller of Kennecott, who developed the extensive evidence summarized above regarding Kennecott's unitary organization and activities; 0. C.
Madsen, Comptroller of the Utah Copper Division, who
developed evidence regarding both the vertical and horizontal dependencies and contributions of the Division; Mr.
Frank M. Keesling, perhaps the nation's most renowned
expert on allocation of multi-state corporate income, who
testified strongly in support of Kennecott's method of filing
and strongly against the attempt by the auditing division
to deviate from the Uniform Act; and the late Dr. Clyde N.
Randall, former Dean of the College of Business at the
University of Utah, highly qualified and knowledgeable
in the areas of accounting as it applies to Utah franchise tax, who supported the taxpayer's method of
filing both as to consolidation and allocation and further criticized as wholly unreasonable the deficiency
assessment approach. The State produced Paul Holt and
Horace Gailey of the auditing division in support of their
deficiency assessment.
Mr. Frank Keesling, who testified in behalf of the
Taxpayer is unquestionably the expert in the area of allocation of income among states for tax purposes. Mr.
Keesling's experience in the franchise tax area began in
1931 when he was a law clerk for the State Board of Equal-
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ization, and from then until 1935 he worked in various executive and legal positions with the California State Board
of Equalization (Tr. 311). During this time, Mr. Keesling,
among other things, wrote a 200 page report recommending changes in the bank and corporation franchise tax law
(Tr. 311), and instituted the California combined return
for filing franchise tax by affiliated corporations (Tr. 213).
Mr. Keesling wrote the brief in what is now the landmark case in the corporate franchise tax area, Butler
Bros. v. McColgan. 1 In his brief, Mr. Keesling set forth
the three unit definition of a unitary business - unity
of ownership, unity of operation and unity of use - which
are set forth and applied in the Utah regulations (Tr.
315). Mr. Keesling is presently with the firm of Loeb
and Loeb of Los Angeles, having become a partner in 1943.
Since that time, one-fourth (
of Mr. Keesling's practice has been devoted to allocation cases (Tr. 316). In
1946, Mr. Keesling collaborated with Mr. George T. Altman in authoring the first edition of what has become the
definitive work in this area, .ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN
STATE TAXATION; a second edition of this book was published in 1950 (Tr. 317-18). Subsequent to writing this
treatise, Mr. Keesling has been involved with his law partner, Mr. Warren, in writing several Law Review Articles
in this same area including articles dealing specifically
with the Uniform Act (Tr. 318).
Mr. Keesling, in his testimony, explained why and
how the Uniform Act came into being. He explained' that
Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334, affd. 315
U. S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).
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prior to adoption of the Uniform Act there was "an appalling lack of uniformity in allocation practices and policies
among the different states" (Tr. 319).
"In 1955, the Commissioners on uniform laws became interested in this subject because of this
wide disparity, confusion and chaos, and a man
named Professor Pierce, working with representatives of different states and conferring with them,
developed a model Uniform Act" (Tr. 320-21).
Mr. Keesling further testified concerning the study of the
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
later known as the Willis Report, which recommended that
the area was so chaotic and of sufficient importance that
federal legislation was needed, (Tr. 321) and that the
threat of federal control induced many states, such as
Utah, to adopt the Uniform Act (Tr. 321-22).
The formula method, and particularly the three factor
formula method as adopted under the Uniform Act, Mr.
Keesling testified, is a very fair way of apportioning income (Tr. 325). He explained:
"If you use separate accounting, you often get
peaks and valleys. You may wind up with the
conclusion that there is a large income in one state
and losses in another, and the net result may be
that the taxpayer may be called on to pay taxes
on a figure greatly in excess of his total income"
(Tr. 325).

Mr. Keesling was asked whether in his opinion, in
light of the unity concept as it applies to the Utah Uniform Act, Kennecott's operations constitute a unit. Mr.
Keesling replied:
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"Looking at Kennecott's operations in New York
and in Utah and in Maryland and Nevada and
New Mexico and Arizona, I am familiar with them
from the testimony that is given here, I think it
is not a typical unitary operation. I think it is a
super unitary operation. I think it is an extraordinary example of unity." (Emphasis added,
Tr. 332-34.)
Mr. Keesling compared the Underwood Typewriter 2
case, the Butler Bros. 3 case, and the Superior Oil Company 4
case, and the entities involved therein, with the Kennecott operation and showed how much more unita1y the
Kennecott operations were than the operations taxed as
unitary operations in those cases (Tr. 333-34). Mr. Keesling was then asked his opinion regarding the state's approach in the deficiency assessment. Mr. Keesling stated:
"I feel strongly that there is no basis [for] deviating from the statutory formula, particularly to go
over to something that is little more than a separate accounting approach, and also, I think you
get a figure that is, to start with, a figure that is
far greater than the actual income or actual taxable income of the company, which is one of the
vices of separate accounting" (Tr. 337).
Mr. Keesling, after outlining his extensive experience
with consolidated and combined returns, gave his opinion
as to the purpose and effect of a consolidated return. He
stated:
2Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, G5 L. Ed.
165, 41 S. Ct. 45 (1924).
317 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334.
4Superior Oil Company v. Franchise Tax Board, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545,
386 P. 2d 33 (1963).
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"The purpose of a consolidated return is to compute the income of a group of companies in much
the same manner as if they were one company, and
that is achieved by eliminating inter-company
transactions, such as inter-company sales and inter-company charges, offsetting what would otherwise be losses of one company against the profits
of another, and you get down to the real income
rather than a figure greater or less than that ...
and I think for the Uniform Act it should be applied just as you would if it were one company"
(Tr. 332).
With respect to the application of the statutory provisions allowing the Tax Commission to deviate from the
statutory formula, Mr. Keesling stated:
"I do know that Professor Pierce, who drafted
it [the Uniform Act with the deviation provision]
thought that it should be used sparingly to take
care of the unusual situation. And that is my opinion too, that if we are going to get. uniformity, I
think we ought to follow the same rules for the
most part" {Tr. 343).
The late Dr. Clyde N. Randall, former Dean of the
College of Business, was called upon to testify before the
State Tax Commission with respect to accounting procedures and the Uniform Act as adopted by Utah. Dr. Randall was eminently qualified to testify as an expert in this
area, having an A.B. Degree in Accounting, a J.D. Degree
from the University of Utah, a Masters Degree in Business Administration and a Ph.D. in Business Administration and Economics from Stanford University (Tr. 374).
In addition, his practical accounting experience included
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positions as Comptroller at the University of Utah, Head
of the Academic Department of Accounting, and as stated,
the Dean of the College of Business (Tr. 374); he was
a Certified Public Accountant in Utah (Tr. 297); and
had taught Income Taxation for approximately 23 years,
(Tr. 374) which included lectures with respect to Utah
corporation franchise tax (Tr. 376). As a result of his
experience, Dr. Randall had become familiar with almost
every aspect of state and federal corporate taxation, including such areas as computation of the depletion deduction for a metal mine, the problems of allocation of
multistate income among several states, and problems of
consolidated returns as they occur in filing Utah tax returns (Tr. 376). Having been called as a witness in the
present case, Dr. Randall had familiarized himself with
the operations of Kennecott Copper Corporation and had
become particularly familiar with the facts concerning the
tax returns for the years in question, i.e., 1967 and 1968
(Tr. 377).
Dr. Randall testified with respect to the reasons for
the drafting of the Uniform Act:
"We feel basically the intention was to effectuate
uniformity among the several states and the allocation of the total multi-state income available for
taxation and to avoid any constitutional problems
from inequities in this area."
Dr. Randall testified that Kennecott, in filing its 1967
and 1968 Utah franchise tax returns, had followed the provisions of the statutory three part allocation formula,
(except for two minor exceptions with respect to deduc-
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tion of federal income tax:es and depletion which were
corrected by amendment), and that the use and result
of such a method fairly represents the extent of the trucpayers' business activity in Utah (Tr. 379). With respect
to the approach taken by the State Tax Commission, Dr.
Randall testified that the Tax: Commission had improperly
disallowed the filing of consolidated returns, and had used
statutory apportionment as to some of the corporations,
and separate accounting as to others (Tr. 379-80).
Specifically, with respect to consolidated returns, Dr.
Randall testified that both statutory and regulatory requirements for filing its consolidated returns had been
met by the Kennecott affiliated group (Tr. 380). He further testified that the consolidated return provisions of
the Utah state franchise tax act permit the aggregating
of income of all affiliates and losses of the various units
involved in the consolidated return. This in effect creates
a new tax:able entity, treating a consolidated group as a
single tax:payer (Tr. 380-81).
Dr. Randall explained how the Uniform Act would
be applied to the consolidated group:
"You would aggregate the gross income from each
member of the affiliated group, second, you would
aggregate the allowable deductions for each group
of the affiliated group. By subtracting the aggregated deductions from the aggregated gross income,
you would arrive at a figure defined in Regulation
4 (12) as 'consolidated income'.
consolidated
income you would deduct certam duect allocable
items of income such as dividends, interest, rents
and royalties, and etc. Then when you have ar-
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rived at this figure, which would be described I
would call it consolidated net income subject 'to
apportionment, you would then derive a single
three-part formula for all the property, payroll and
sales of the consolidated group. The consolidated
net income subject to apportionment would be
multiplied by a percentage arrived by your formula
which would give you the net income
to Utah."
Dr. Randall testified that the Tax Commission could depart from the statutory formula only upon an affirmative
showing that the allocation and apportionment provisions
of the act did not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayers' business activity in this state (Tr. 388). It was
Dr. Randall's opinion that the statutory formula does
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayers' business done
in the state, (Tr. 388) and that the method used by the
Tax Commission did not effectuate an equitable allocation
or apportionment of the taxpayers' income to the state
(Tr. 390). Dr. Randall's first basis of reasoning for this
conclusion was the fact that the Tax Commission has used
as its starting point the concept of income from the property for depletion purposes. He stated that this is a special concept for a special purpose and is not the concept
upon which an allocation of income for purposes of taxation should be based (Tr. 390). As a second basis, Dr.
Randall stated that the Tax Commission's method disallows to the Utah Copper Division of Kennecott, the
benefits of any losses or units outside the State of Utah
as allowed in the Western Contracting decision (Tr. 391).
In making his determination that the Tax Commission's
method for allocating income to Utah did not fairly repre-
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sent the business activities within Utah, he showed that
the Tax Commission's other report allocated 30% more
income to the Utah Copper Division than the federal income tax return for the same year allocated to the entire
operation of Kennecott (Tr. 395).
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, the Tax Commission proceeded to render its
decision which, with one relatively minor exception, was
simply a rubber-stamp approval of the deficiency assessment.
POINT I.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DENYING
TO TAXPAYER THE RIGHT TO FILE A
CONSOLIDATED RETURN.
A.

Distinction Between Allocation and Consolidation.

As viewed by the taxpayer, the two major issues in
this case, consolidation and allocation, although they involve analogous questions of tax theory and policy, present
basically distinct and severable questions which should be
analyzed and resolved severally. Consolidation of affiliated corporate taxpayers into one taxable entity is a matter of basic, substantive tax law in the State of Utah. Its
statutory basis is UTAH CoDE ANNOTATED, Sec. 59-13-23,
which was enacted in the pattern of then existing Federal
tax law in 1931. 5
The statute and corresponding Commission regulasBennett Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108,
426 P. 2d 812 (1967).
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tions deal with the rather fundamental question of what
is the entity to be taxed. Unlike allocation, the consolidation question pertains equally to affiliate corporations
engaged in either intrastate or interstate business activities; and no different result should be reached on a consolidation question merely because a group of affiliates
falls in one category or another. 6
Allocation under the Uniform Act, 1 however, deals
with a separate question entirely, i.e., once it is determined as a matter of the state's substantive tax law what
the taxable entity is and what its income is, how then is
that income to be allocated to the taxing state? Certainly,
the Utah Legislature, in adopting the Uniform Act,
could not have intended to go beyond the allocation matter and amend or modify the substantive aspects of Utah's
franchise tax law, including those portions dealing with
consolidated returns.
This basic distinction between the substantive tax
law of a state and the allocation provisions of the Uniform
Act has been emphasized by one of the act's draftsmen:
"At the outset it should be made clear that the
uniform act makes two significant basic assumptions that should not be overlooked. First, it assumes that the state has jurisdiction to levy the
particular tax. Thus, the question of whether the
levy itself is violative of either the Due Process
Clause or Interstate Commerce Clause of the
sAt least the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
should
any such disparity.
7UTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-78 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
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United States Constitution is assumed to have
been given satisfactory disposition. Second, the
uniform act assumes that the existing state legislature has defined the base of the tax and that the
only remaining problem is the amount of the base
that should be assigned to the particular taxing
jurisdiction. Thus, the statute does not deal with
the problem of ascertaining the items used in computing income or the allowable items of expense.
These assumptions must be kept in mind as there
has been some confusion in the concepts involved.
The proposal does not provide for the tax or the
tax base; it merely provides for an equitable means
of apportioning and allocating the income to individual states when the taxpayer is engaged in business in more than one state." 8

In view of this rather basic distinction, the issues of
consolidation and allocation will be dealt with hereinafter
as separate issues, except to the extent that it will be
necessary to discuss specific aspects of the Commission's
decision which have blurred this line of demarcation.

B. The Theory of Consolidation.
The Utah statute on consolidated returns is simple
and to the point:
"An affiliated group of ... corporations shall,
subject to the provisions of this section, have the
privilege of making a consolidated return for any
taxable year in lieu of separate returns ..." 9
BPierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35
TAXES 747 ( 1957). (Emphasis in the quoted material is in the
original text.)
9UTAH CODE ANN., §59-13-23 (1953).
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The technical requirements of the statute and regulations10 are minimal and the Commission found that the
affiliated Utah group met the requisite conditions. 11 There
is absolutely no legislative authority granted to the Commission to disallow a consolidated return once the group
meets the statutory requirements.
The theory behind the consolidated return statute is
readily apparent - a qualified group of affiliates should
simply be treated as if it were one corporation for tax
purposes. Not only is this purpose supportable as a matter of linguistics, 12 but, in addition, this court has construed
the statute at least twice with the same result. In Bennett
Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, 13 the court
stated that the "basic concept" of the statute was that
affiliated corporations "are properly regarded as a unified business entity ... " In J. M. & M. S. Browning Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 14 (an allocation case) the court
observed that there were three wholly-owned subsidiaries
of the parent and "For the purpose of this suit they may
be considered as one consolidated company". Numerous
1outah State Tax Commission, CORPORATION FRANCHISE AND
INCOME TAX ACTS AND REGULATIONS (Nov. 1967), Corp.
Franchise Tax Reg. No. 4, p. 49.
nsee the Commission's Findings of Fact, Nos. 2 through 7, inclusive.
12WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (College Ed.) defines "consolidate" as "to combine into one; merge; unite".
13

19 Utah 2d 108, 426 P. 2d 812 (1967).

11107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 (1945).
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other authorities have delineated the purpose of consolidated returns similarly. 15

C. The Dispute Between the Parties.
We are faced with a rather anomalous situation in
delineating the exact parameters of the current dispute
on consolidation. Taxpayer contends, and our experts
agree,1a that the plain effect of the assessment is to ''unconsolidate" our returns and to deny to taxpayer its basic
rights granted by UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §59-13-23
(1953). The Commission apparently agrees that it would
have no right to "unconsolidate" the returns, and, in fact,
has expressly found that it did not do so. 11 Although
superficially somewhat comforting, the Commission's finding simply does not square with the facts.
As we view it, the basic issue is simply this: At what
point in the tax computations should the consolidation
take place? The following chart graphically illustrates
the nature of the problem. Taxpayer has consolidated
its returns and, in effect, erased corporate lines at the first
isRudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171
at 197 (1970) states: "In the case of a consolidated return, the
separate entities of the various member corporations are, in a sense,
disregarded ... ". Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, House Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, H. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess.,
241l (Hereinafter referred to as House Study): "If such a return
is fully 'consolidated' then the multi-corporate enterprise is, in
effect, regarded as one entity ... ".
isTr. 380-83.
11see the Commission's Conclusion of Law, No. 7.
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step in the computations. The Commission has not introduced consolidation until after it has separately computed
for each corporation the net income allocated to Utah.
It is submitted that the Commission's approach completely
emasculates the concept of consolidation and amounts to
little more than adding up tax results - an approach best
described as merely a conglomeration rather than a consolidation.
CHART IV.
Computatwn Steps
Gross Income

Point of Consolidation
Taxpayer

(-) Deductions
( =) Net Income

(x) Allocation Formula
( =) Income Allocated to Utah

(x) Tax Rate

Tax Commission

(=) Tax

In support of our position, we refer again to the underlying purpose of consolidation, i.e., to treat affiliates
18
as if they were all one "unified business entity. The
Commission has quite obviously thwarted this purpose
and has, for all critical computations, treated a group of
affiliates as if they were separate corporations. The Commission has also blatantly violated its own regulations in
this respect. Corporate Franchise Tax Regulation No.
4 (12) provides:
isBennett Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d
108, 426 P. 2d 812 (1967).
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"Consolidated net income shall be the aggregate of the gross income of each of the includable
corporations less the aggregate of the allowable
deductions of ... such corporations ... ". (Emphasis added.)
This regulation, which, when adopted, followed the language of the then existing federal tax regulation, makes
it abundantly clear that consolidation of affiliates must
commence with the aggregation of gross income and hence
it follows that all ensuing steps must be consolidated, including "consolidated net income" as discussed in Regulation No. 4 ( 12) . No place in the deficiency assessment
can be found a computation even vaguely resembling that
expressly called for in Regulation No. 4 (12) .19
Taxpayer called Dr. Clyde N. Randall to discuss
the proper method of preparing consolidated returns. He
endorsed the method used by the taxpayer and expressed
the opinion that the basic purpose of the Utah statute was
"to treat the taxpayer as a single entity" (Tr. 381). Moreover, he delineated the step-by-step method of computation, starting with the consolidation of gross income and
continuing through all the various steps, including "a
single three-part formula for all of the property, payroll, and sales of the consolidated group" (Tr. 382).
He further expressed the opinion that while the taxpayer
had complied with the consolidation provisions of the
is of at least tangential significance that Form TC-20, furnished
by the Tax Commission for Corporate Franchise Tax Returns, as
a mechanical matter, could not even be adapted to the method
utilized by the Commission (See Exhibit "B").

191t
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statute and regulations, the Commission had "unconsolidated" the returns and violated its own Regulation No.
4 (12) (Tr. 382-83).
Other recognized authorities concur with Dr. Randall's analysis:
"
. the consolidated income of the entire
group is reported on a single return; and a single
tax is paid on the total income shown on such
return. If the group is engaged in an interstate
business it will, of course, be necessary to apply
the apportionment formula to determine the part
of the consolidated income subject to tax in the
particular state ... " 20
We refer also to an article by Professor Hellerstein,
a leading authority in the field of state and locai taxation:
"The underlying justification for applying an apportionment formula to the over-all tax base of a
multistate business is that there exists a unitary
enterprise being carried on in more than one state.
The formula is a device for attributing to the taxing state its share of the over-all tax measure that
admittedly is attributable only in part to the state.
This principle extends, at least in a good many
states, both to the branches of a single corporation
and to subsidiaries and affiliated corporations that
are a part of the enterprise. By applying the typical three factor formula, the property, receipts _and
payroll ratios of all branches, subsidiaries and affiliates are talrnn into account in determining appor2

0Rudolph, supra note 15 at 197.
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tionment ratios, which are then applied to the tax
base of the entire business." 21
These discussions make it abundantly clear that the
net income of a consolidated group, as aggregated, should
be allocated by a single three-factor formula.
The Browning case, 22 although not addressed to this
specific question, would seem to be consistent with the
basic approach suggested by Dr. Randall when it speaks
of the affiliated groups as "one consolidated company"
and, throughout the opinion, all discussions regarding
formulas and factors are on the basis of a single corporation and a single apportionment formula as applied to the
consolidated group. Likewise, the leading treatise in the
field 23 indicates that "The filing of a consolidated return
implies that the income of the group will be treated as
a unit and taxed as a unit." 24
Indeed, all of the authorities discussed above, including specifically the Bennett case 25 stress that the purpose
of consolidation is to treat an affiliated group as one taxable entity. It cannot be seriously questioned that, in the
21

Hellerstein , Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and
the Circumscription of a Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487, 496
(1968).

22107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 (1945).

23G. ALTMAN &
- TION (1946).

F.

KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE

24Jd. at 167.
2519 Utah 2d 108, 426 P. 2d 812 (1967).
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case of allocation, this presupposes that only one formula
will be used for the entire consolidated group.

The Commission's "Justification" For Departure.

D.

The decision of the Commission is carefully eclectic
on the matter of consolidation. First, the Commission
says it has not "unconsolidated" the returns (Conclusion
of Law, No. 7). Obviously aware that no one could really
believe this, the Commission goes on to attempt to justify
its "unconsolidation" on two equally spurious grounds:
(1)

UTAH CODE .ANNOTATED, section 59-13-17 (1953).

For the first time in its decision (no previous warning having been given in either the deficiency assessment
or the auditing division's brief), the Commission seemingly purports to justify its violation of the consolidation
statute by relying on UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, section 5913-17 (1953), which provides:
"In any case of two or more corporations (whether
or not organized or doing business in this state,
and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
tax commission is authorized to distribute, apportion or allocate gross income or deductions between
or among such corporations, if it determines that
such distribution, apportionment or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of ·such corporations."
Section 59-13-17 is identical to and was obviously
patterned after section 45 of the Revenue Act of 1928,
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the predecessor of present section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. §482. Therefore, under normal rules of statutory construction, 26 and also in
keeping with the announced intention of the Commission
"to follow as closely as possible federal requirements" 21
we deem it highly appropriate to refer to Federal
sources for interpretation. Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue
its Utah counterpart were enacted
for the
purpose of preventing controlled or affiliated corporations from gerrymandering their income and
expenses in such a way as to artificially reduce taxable
income. The governing criterion of section 482 is whether
or not the transactions between controlled corporations
are conducted at arm's length. If so, there is no justification for reallocating gross income or deductions. Indeed,
the federal regulations 29 themselves provide:
"The standard to be applied in every case is that
of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length
2ssee Bennett Association v. Utah State Tax Commi,ssion, 19 Utah
2d 108 at 111, 426 P. 2d 812 at 814 (1967), wherein under analogous
circumstances, this court stated: "Reference to cases interpreting
the Federal Statute and Regulations is helpful."
21see Utah Corp. Franchise Tax Regulation No. 14, which provides in
part: "It is the policy of the Utah State Tax Commission, in matters
involving the determination of net income for Utah corporation
franchise tax purposes, to follow as closely as possible federal requirements with respect to the same matters. In some instances, of
course, the federal and state statutes differ, and due to such conflict, the federal rulings, regulations, and decisions cannot be followed. Furthermore, in some instances, the Commission may disagree with the federal determinations, and will not consider them
controlling for Utah corporation franchise tax purposes."
2s26 U. S. C. A. §482.
29Treas. Reg. §1.482-l(b) (1).
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with another uncontrolled taxpayer." (Emphasis
added.)
With this background, it requires no particular ingenuity to see that Kennecott and its affiliates do not
come within the application of the section 482 concept.
deed, the Tax Commission has made an express fin ding
which, on its face, absolutely negates any unfair dealings
between the affiliates and absolutely precludes any reasonable application of the section 482 concept. We refer to
the Commission's Finding of Fact No. 19 which provides:
"19. Any sales of mineral products made by Kennecott to its fabricating subsidiaries, and any purchases made by Kennecott of the products of its
subsidiaries, are made between the corporations
on an arm's length basis at the same prices as are
charged to others. To the extent that Kennecott
receives dividends from any of its subsidiaries,
these are taken up in its accounts as dividend receipts. Any other items of inter-company charges
and receipts are likewise booked and accounted
for as between separate corporations. Accordingly,
the books and accounts of Kennecott give the separate accounting for its operations and affairs as
distinguished from the operations and affairs of
its separate subsidiary or related corporations."
(Emphasis added.)
We submit that the Commission's findings and conclusions are internally inconsistent and that the Commission should be precluded from finding, on the one
hand, that all of the dealings between the affiliates are at
arm's length (this having suited the Commission's pur-

38

pose in support of its separate accounting argument), and
then finding that it was necessary to re-allocate income
among the corporations to prevent tax evasion. The Commission's finding that section 59-13-17 of the Utah Code
is applicable is a classic case of arbitrary, unreasonable
and wholly capricious administrative action.
However, even if there were some justification for
applying the section 482 concept (which we assume only
arguendo) , the Commission has not applied that concept.
Please note that both section 59-13-17 and section 482
authorize the taxing agency to distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income or deductions between or among
controlled corporations. The Commission has not done
this. Rather, it has treated each corporation as a separate
entity, notwithstanding the clear letter and intent of the
consolidation statute and regulations. We have exhaustively researched the federal cases and have found not one
in which the Internal Revenue Service even attempted to
set aside a consolidated return under section 482. In point
of fact, the federal regulations promulgated under section
482 specifically preclude such action by stating:
"If a controlled taxpayer is a party to a consolidated return, the true consolidated taxable income
of the affiliated group and the true separate taxable income of the controlled taxpayer are determined consistently with the principles of a consolidated return." Treas. Reg. §1.482-1 (b) (2)
(Emphasis added.)

In other words, the right to consolidate is not impeachable
by application of section 482; to the contrary, any appli-
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cation of section 482 to a consolidated group must be
consistent with the principles of consolidation. The Commission's attempt here to apply section 482 principles,
rather than being consistent with consolidation rules, is
a complete abandonment of the most basic principles of
consolidation.
(2)

UTAH CoDE ANNOTATED, Section 59-13-95 (Supp.
1969)

The second defense used by the Commission to justify its "unconsolidation" is UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 59-13-95 (Supp. 1969). This section is not a part of
the substantive tax law of Utah, but is intended as a "relief provision" under the Uniform Act on allocation.
We will deal first with the question of whether the
relief provision has any applicability at all to the consolidation of affiliates. In this respect, it is well to recall that
the basic and sole purpose of the Uniform Act is to allocate income within and without the State of Utah. The
act is not intended to alter or amend the tax base established by the state. 30 It follows, a fortiori, that the Uniform Act relief provision was not intended to give the
Commission authority to alter or amend, by administrative fiat, the consolidation statute. It would be equally
ludicrous for the Commission to argue that under the
Uniform Act relief provision, it could increase the tax rate
from 6% to 10%, or could eliminate the deduction for
30Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes,
35 TAXES 747 (1957).
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depletion. In short, the Uniform Act was never intended
to give the Commission any authority to deal with anything except allocation - not between corporations, but
between states.
The relief provision itself is expressly restricted. It
provides: n
"If the allocation and apportionment provisions of
this act do not fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this state, ... " (Emphasis added.)

then the Commission has certain powers to use other allocation methods. The act is silent, and appropriately so,
as to any such powers in the event the Commission should
decide to rewrite substantive aspects of the tax law itself32
Carrying the Commission's decision to its logical conclusion, let us assume, arguendo, that the Uniform Act
relief provisions do authorize the Commission to set aside
a consolidated return. Let us further assume, as is the
3 1 UTAH CODE ANN., §59-13-95 (Supp. 1969).
a2The relief provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-13-95 is
clearly susceptible to the application of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis. In setting out the alternative methods which may be employed, the statute provides for: "(a) Separate accounting; (b) the
exclusion of any one or more of the factors; (c) the inclusion of one
or more additional factors which will fairly represent the taxpayer's
business activity in this state, or (d) the employment of any other
method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of
the taxpayer's income." (Emphasis added.) The last subparagraph,
upon which the Commission must rely (for it has clearly not followed (a), (b), or (c)) would seem to be restricted to the same
genera of alternatives as set forth in the three preceding subparagraphs. A fair reading, in this light, would certainly preclude a
far-reaching change in substantive tax law as proposed by the Commission. See W. S. Hatch Co. v. Public Service Commission, 3 Utah
2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809 (1954).

41

case, that there is no other statutory prov1s1on which
gives the Commission that power. The net result is that
the relief provisions of the act are patently unconstitutional inasmuch as, under these circumstances, the Commission would have the power to "unconsolidate" the return of taxpayers in interstate business (for the Uniform
Act only so applies), but would have no such power as to
a group of corporate affiliates engaged in strictly intrastate business. This construction, on its face, would invalidate the statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause
(United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2) as well.
This alone should refute the Commission's purported
effort to so construe the Uniform Act in view of the rule
of construction which favors constitutional construction
of statutes where possible. 33
The other aspect of the Commission's use of the Uniform Act to somehow validate its attempted "unconsolidation" is found in its Conclusion of Law No. 8 wherein
the Commission finds that the Uniform Act simply does
not apply to consolidated groups since, if it did, it would
have spoken of taxpayers in "a plural sense". This conclusion is a clear illustration of the lengths to which the
Com.mission has gone to justify a completely untenable
proposition. What was said hereinabove about the. limited role of the Uniform Act applies equally to the re33American Power & Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 329 U. S. 90, 91 L. Ed. 103, 67 S. Ct. 133 (1946); Salter V.
Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P. 2d 1061 (1935).

buttal of Conclusion No. 8. Apparently, what the Commission wants us to believe is that the word "taxpayer" in
the singular must refer only to single corporations and
cannot refer to an affiliated group. We believe this to be
a totally untenable construction. First, the clear and frequently stated purpose of consolidation is to treat a group
as a taxpayer. This purpose is completely subverted by
the Tax Commission's strained construction. Secondly, if
one were to carry this construction to its logical conclusion, it would mean that wherever, in the franchise tax
statutes, the term "taxpayer" is used, that the reference
excludes consolidated groups. Following this reductio ad
absurdum, we would find:
Consolidated groups cannot be required to keep inventories - (See the word "taxpayer" in Section 59-135 (3) .)

Consolidated groups are not subject to the return
period adjustment - (Section 59-13-19 - applies only to
a "taxpayer").
Consolidated groups are not entitled to extensions of
time as a "taxpayer" under Section 59-13-25.
We could go on ad nauseum, to point out that the
word "taxpayer", unadorned by plurality, is used literally
hundreds of times in the corporate franchise tax provisions of the Utah statutes. If that word were so construed
as to apply only to unconsolidated corporations and to
exclude consolidated groups, the net result would be a
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crazy-quilt of absurdities. The supreme court in Bennett34 and Browning" 5 and the Commission in Regulation
4 (12), have stated that the clear purpose of consolidation is to treat an affiliated group as a single "taxpayer" and this is the only logical way the Uniform Act
could be applied. Moreover, the official draft of the Uniform Act 36 itself makes reference to consolidated returns.
In the official comment under section 16, the draft provides:

"If returns are not consolidated under existing

state tax law, it may be necessary to use Section
18 to make a fair representation of business income." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it is clear that the drafters of the act had in mind
that it would apply to consolidated groups if state law
provided for consolidated returns.
What we said above about the Commerce Clause applies with equal validity here. If, indeed the Uniform Act
applies only to separate corporations, the result is a rank
discrimination in favor of intrastate affiliated groups who
are free to consolidate, and against interstate businesses,
who are effectively precluded from consolidation. We
cannot believe such discrimination could stand in view
of the Commerce Clause. 37
3•19 Utah 2d 108, 426 P. 2d 812 (1967).

s•107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 (1945).
ssExhibit "D", Tr. 555-65. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR
TAX PURPOSES ACT as drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1957).
s1see Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, 26 L. Ed. 565 (1881).
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E.

The Unitary Concept.

There is no statutory, administrative, or judicial requirement that an affiliated group, in order to file a consolidated return, must be "unitary". 38 In Utah, under the
consolidated return statute, the only substantive requirement is 95% stock ownership - with which a group is
presumed to be a unified entity. 39
The Tax Commission, however, has held that Kennecott and its affiliates are "unitary".4° Although not requisite from the consolidation standpoint, this finding certainly strengthens the rationale and theory of consolidation in this case. Beginning with Butler Bros., 41 and
through the whole evolution to more current cases such
as Honolulu Oil,4 2 Superior Oil, 43 and Western Contracting," the clear development of the law has been that when
a "unitary" corporation exists, the business and profits
of that corporation must initially be treated as one and
then allocated through formulary apportionment. Thus,
as to unitary corporations, the separate accounting apaBThe term "unitary" is used in the same fashion as defined by this
Court in Western Contracting v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966), and as used in the Commission's regulations.
39Bennett Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 108,
426 P. 2d 812 (1967).
4DSee the Commission's Conclusion of Law No. 4.
41Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, Ill P. 2d 334,, aff'd. 315
U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).
42Honolulu Oil Corporation v. Franchise Tax Board, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552,
386 P. 2d 40 (1963).
4a34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P. 2d 33 (1963).
4418 Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
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proach has been uniformly eschewed. •5 Beyond the single-corporation level, there has been a successful effort by
at least two states, Califomia and Oregon, (the former
being quite widely acknowledged as the forerunner in this
field) to utilize the unitary business concept to cross
corporate as well as state lines."; These states, in the
absence of a consolidation statute and regardless of
whether the affiliated corporations all do business in the
taxing state, have extended their taxing jurisdiction and
clearly pierced both state and corporate lines.
The same rationale, patterned after Butler, but extended, can apply in this case. Since the Commission has
found that the group is unitary, it should be required to
treat the group as one single entity. The whole theory of
unitary business. is that, for tax purposes, the thing to
look at is economic reality rather than corporate or state
lines (both of which are clearly anachronistic in today's
complicated, interstate, multi-corporate businesses). Substance, in other words, should prevail over corporate form.
What the Commission has done below is to evoke a
horrendous triumph of form over substance. Not only has
•sSee Crawford Manufacturing Company v. State Comm. of Rev. and
Taxation, 180 Kan. 352, 304 P. 2d 504 (1956); Western Contracting
v. State Tax Comm., 18 Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966); and
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334, affd. 315
U. S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).

•aEdison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 182 P. 2d 16
(1947); Zale-Salem, Inc., v. State Tax Commission, 237 Ore. 261,
391 P. 2d 601 (1964); Chase Brass and Copper Co. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 7 Cal. App. 3d 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970); appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 27 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1970).
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the Commission disregarded the clear language of the consolidation statute and regulations, but in addition, it has,
with the stroke of a pen, simply wiped out the basic theory
laid down in Butler and its progeny, including the Western Contracting decision of this court. The Commis!'lion's
attempt to apply antiquated "separate accounting" principles to the consolidated group should not be sustained.
F. Conclusion as to Consolidation.

It is respectfully submitted that the Commission has
acted contrary to law in the matter of consolidation. It
has "unconsolidated" the corporate group with absolutely
no authority. It has attempted to justify its actions by
strained or twisted applications of concepts which are
clearly inappropriate, and it has simply exterminated the
whole premise and theory of consolidated returns, not to
mention that of "unitary" corporations.
By way of relief, taxpayer requests that this court
rule that the members of the affiliated group must be reconsolidated, and that their "consolidated net income"
must be allocated in accordance with the Uniform Act.
This must be done regardless of whether the court should
sustain or denounce the Commission's position on allocation.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING
THE RELIEF PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM ACT TO TAXPAYER - THE ALLOCATION QUESTION.
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A.

Some Background on Allocation

The need to allocate income among or between states
finds its premise in our basic form of federalism and the
admonition of the Commerce Clause." Likewise, the Due
Process Clause plays its role in the matter of jurisdiction
of the state to levy taxes.4 8
A historical compromise between adherence to constitutional requirements and the basic desire of each state
to maximize its revenue has produced an amazing variety
of methods by which the states have allocated corporate
income. The basic categories, each with numerous variants, are:

Specific Allocation-The concept of allocating certain
income to the situs of an income-producing item - e.g.,
rental income is allocated to the state where the rental
income property is located.
Separate Accounting-The determination of income
separately for the taxing state without reference to extrastate income.
Formulary Apportionment-The use of a formula (using one or more factors) to allocate a portion of total income to a state.
41U. S. CONST. ART. I, §8, cl. 3; Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v.
North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123, 75 L.Ed. 879 (1931); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).
4BKennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commissi.on, 5 Utah 2d
306 at 316, 301 P.2d 562 at 568 (1956), in which this court stated:
"Also entering upon the constitutionality of state taxation of property
and activities beyond its borders ... is the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
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It is obvious that the more variation there is between
states' allocation methods, the greater the chance that
unreasonable and unconstitutional allocation will result.
It is also obvious that uniformity of approach will virtually
eliminate inequities and double taxation. Thus, over the
years, there has been a great hue and cry for uniformity.
No real impetus was supplied to the states until Congress
began to consider federal legislation which would govern
this matter and, at the same time, create serious inroads
into the states' taxing sovereignty. In October of 1965,
H.R. 11798 was introduced after an in-depth study.4 9 This
bill would have virtually removed the states from this field
of taxation. 00 The response has been almost overwhelming.
At the time of the House study, there were some thirtyeight (38) states which taxed corporations on their net
income (either directly or as a measure for franchise taxes)
of which only three (3) had then enacted the Uniform
Act. ' 1 Since that time, and largely as a result of threats
from Congress, the total number has risen to twenty-two
(22) including as of January 1, 1967, the State of Utah. 52
Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has now
•9Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
House Committee on the Judiciary, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H. R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964). (Referred
to hereinafter as "House Study".)
5o Among other things, the Bill would have required a federal
uniform formula, use of the Federal Tax Code to determine taxable
income, and central administrative powers in the Federal Government
over state taxes.

51Housic Study, p. 122.
s2J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 347 (1968).
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recognized the prevalence of the three-factor formula. 53
Utah has done everything possible to prevent federal
intervention. Prior to 1967, it utilized a form of the Massachusetts formula which, as this court noted in Wes tern
Contracting 5 4, if applied uniformly would eliminate double
taxation. Effective in 1967, it adopted the Uniform Act.
The legislative history of the Uniform Act makes it clear
the legislators were deeply concerned about federal intervention in this field. 55 The legislature was also concerned
about uniformity, since the key to preventing federal
intervention is unformity among the states. 56
53 General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbw, 380 U.S. 553,
85 S. Ct. 1156, 14 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1965).
51 Western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commision, 18 Utah 2d
23 at 31, 414 P.2d 579 at 585 (1966).
55 Quoting from Senator Welch (16th Legislative day), January
24, 1967, S.B. 7: "Now, there are some basic reasons for the desirability of this Bill. Primarily, of course, to try to make more uniform
this matter of taxation in respect to states and businesses which have
business in more than one state. But more than that, there is a pressmg need for the cause [sic] we feel that this type of taxation should
rest and stay with the states rather than with the Federal government.
Now, there has been before the Congress a Bill, there have been three
separate Bills now entered before Congress, one right after the other,
which to some extent and to large extent, would take away from the
states the power to tax interstate business and, or multi-state business, let's put it that way, where businesses have business and income
in more than one state. Now, there was a hearing held before Congress
before a Committee of Congress, and 49 of the 50 states appeared
and testified against this Federal legislation. Now, this is one step
towards trying to solve the problems of the business community
in which they are desirous of having a more uniform method of taxation, they are desirous of having more uniform procedures, more uniform forms and more uniform taxation and problems settled as between states."
56UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, § 59-13-96 (Supp. 1969), provides:
"This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it."
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We review this history to set the stage for our
following discussion. The simple and plain fact of the
matter is that to deviate from the "uniformula" is
to deviate from uniformity, to subvert the very premise of
the Uniform Act, and to invite the federal government to
substitute its judgment for that of the states. These ramifications should not be taken lightly in view of the plain
intentions of the Utah Legislature.

B. The Commission Has Not Met Its Burden of Proof
(1) The Nature of the Burden.

Whether or not the relief provision should be applied
to Taxpayer is not to be resolved by applying the normal
concept of judicial review that the administrative body
shall be sustained unless it has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. Rather, when a party (be it an
administrative body or a taxpayer) seeks to deviate from
the three-part formula, that party assumes the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the formula is grossly inadequate.
We could cite numerous cases from varied jurisdictions regarding the burden of proof incumbent upon one
seeking to deviate from the formula, but this seems somewhat unnecessary in view of the fact that, in Utah, we
have a recent case which discussess this very problem in
detail and comes to clear, well-defined and strong conclusions-Western Contracting Corporation u. State Tax
Commission. 5 ' There, as here, the Utah State Tax Com5718 Utah 2d 23, 414 P.2d 579 (1966)
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mission was attempting to deviate from the formula and
impose a separate accounting approach. 58
With respect to the burden of proof, this court's
statement in Western Contracting could not be stronger:
"We hold that, if the operations of a multi-state
corporation be unitary in character, the proportion
of net income to be allocated to this state must be
determined by the statutory formula (subsection
6) unless the party opposing the application of
such formula shall prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the taxes so imposed are grossly disproportionate to the business conducted in this
state or subjects the taxpayer to double taxation." (emphasis added) 59
Further in the opinion, discussing the same burden, the
court observed:
"Unless this is made to appear by clear and cogent
evidence, the formula should be applied." 60
The court went further and discussed not only the
quantum, but also the quality and character of proof re·5Blt might be observed that the Western Contracting case was
decided under the old Massachusetts Formula Allocation Act whereas
the instant case involves the Uniform Act adopted effective January 1,
1967. Although the basic rationale applies equally under both Acts,
we believe that the Wes tern Contracting decision applies with even
greater force now that this state has the Uniform Act. This is so
because the concept of uniformity, although important under the
old Act is greatly stressed in the Uniform Act, and the relief provisions themselves gave the Commission far broader discretion under the
old Act than it presently has under the Uniform Act. Compare UTAH
CODE ANN. (1953) 59-13-8 (Repealed) with UTAH CODE ANN. 59-13-95
(Supp. 1969).

5918 Utah 2d at 31, 414 P.2d 585.
so18 Utah 2d at 36, 414 P.2d at 588.
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quired. It is not enough, under the Western Contracting
decision, for the Tax Commission to present evidence directed at only one factor of the formula. Rather the Supreme Court, in adopting a previous decision by the California Supreme Court (Butler Bros. v. McColgan), 61
stated:
"There must be clear and cogent evidence directed
to each element of' the equation to prove that the
assumed relation among the various factors produced an erroneous result."
Thus, the Western Contracting case recognized that the
three-part formula, consisting of payroll, property and
sales, constitutes a reasonable compromise utilizing different factors and that irregularities in one factor will be
outweighed by the accuracy of the other factors. Thus, the
formula should be abandoned only if the relationship of
all three factors is grossly disproportionate.
Also significant, so far as the instant case is concerned, is the holding by the court that a mere comparison
between separate accounting, on the one hand, and the
formula approach on the other, is not sufficient to impeach
the formula:
"The Court [in Butler Bros.] observed that it need
not impeach the separate accounting system used
by the appellant to say that it does not prove its
assertion that extra territorial values are being
taxed, for the results of the accounting system
employed by appellant do not impeach the validity
6117 Cal. 2d 664, Ill P.2d 334,
86 L.Ed. 991 (1942).

aff'd 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701,
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or propriety of the formula which California has
applied here." 62
The foregoing extracts from the Western Contracting
decision recognize the clear preference for the formula and
the heavy burden which must be sustained by anyone
objecting to the formula. Although this is well established
in sound law, it is even more applicable under the Uniform
Act. Various authors discussing the relief provisions of the
Uniform Act have made it extremely clear that very
compelling reasons must be found for deviating from the
Act. We quote, for example, an article by Messrs. Sarver
and Hynes, both of whom are with the Illinois Department
of Revenue:
"The great attractiveness of the U.D.I.T.P.A. is in
the 'U.' It is a uniform statute. It is widely adopted.
Any state deciding to adopt an income tax law or
to change an existing tax law could use U.D.I.T.
P.A. as a model and then avoid any of its alleged
pitfalls by adopting clear regulations. It would
have to find remarkably strong reasons for not following the U.D.I.T.P.A. approach." (Emphasis
added.) 63
We also quote from an excellent article by Keesling and
Warren, the former of whom appeared as a witness on
Kennecott's behalf before the Tax Commission:
6218 Utah 2d at 29. This is a sound interpretation of Butler Bros.
One author has observed regarding that case: "Its holding must be
read as a conclusion that separate accounting is inherently incapable
of impeaching an apportionment formula." W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES
TO OTHER STATES, 3-18 (1963).
63Sarver and Hynes, Proposal for a Uniform Regulation on Business Income Under I.D.I.T.P.A., 22 HASTINGS L.J. 31 (1970).
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"The question arises whether the relief provisions
should be interpreted broadly to permit the Board
to use separate accounting or other methods extensively or whether they should be interpreted narrowly so as to permit the Board to deviate from the
rules only in rare and unusual situations.

There are completely compelling reasons for giving the relief provisions a narrow construction.
Under a broad construction the purposes of obtaining uniformity through the adoption of the
Uniform Act would be defeated. If a choice of
methods is permitted, different administrators in
different states inevitably will choose different
methods. As a result, even if all the states imposing taxes on or measured by income should adopt
the Uniform Act, the chaotic condition heretofore
existing would continue to exist.
Professor Pierce, the draftsman of the Uniform
Act, clearly was of the opinion that the relief provisions should be interpreted narrowly and were
designed to permit the use of methods different
than those prescribed in the Act only in unusual
cases and in cases where the application of the
specifically prescribed methods might be held unconstitutional. Shortly after the act was drafted
he published an article discussing these provisions.
He states that '[t]he Uniform Act, if adopted in
every state having a net income tax or a tax measured by net income, would assure that 100 percent of income, and no more and no less, would be
taxed.' Obviously, this statement would not be
true if the relief provisions were interpreted to
give the administrators in the different states broad
discretion in the selection of alternative methods." 6 '
(Emphasis added.)
64Keesling and Warren, California's Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes Act. 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 156 at 171 (1967)
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(2) The Nature of the Proof

In a subsequent point in this brief, we will outline
specifically how the commission has deviated from the
Uniform Act and specifically what methods it has utilized.
For purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to point
out that the commission deviated from the Uniform Act
and purportedly applied the relief provisions of UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, Section 59-13-95 (1953) .65
The initial question which must be answered in the
negative before the relief provision can be applied is
whether or not the formula "fairly represent[s] the extent of the taxpayer's business activity in this state." It
is significant to note that the act does not talk in terms
of net income earned in the state, but rather in terms of
"business activity." This is in keeping with the theory of
the tax it.self, as observed by this court in Western Contracting:
"Subsection (6) of the above quoted statute does
not purport to tax directly a corporation doing
business both within and without the state on the
net income which may be credited by a system accounting to business done within the state. Rather,
it seeks to tax a percentage of the entire net income, wherever it may be earned, by a formula of
apportionment composed of three distinct factors.
"66

In its decision, the Commission set forth numerous
findings of fact which purport to bear upon the matter
65Conclusions of Law, Nos. 5 through 9.
6618 Utah 2d at 27, 414 P.2d at 582.
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of "business activity." A number of these may be summarily disregarded as irrelevant. There are a number of
findings, for example, which simply set forth various
glowing superlatives regarding the size and production
of the Utah mine. 6 ' There is another which refers to the
1966 tax return" 8 which it was stipulated69 is not binding
upon taxpayer or the Commission. There are yet others 10
which discuss the method of divisional accounting employed by the taxpayer. As noted, however, separate
accounting techniques do not validly impeach the formula.n
Arriving then, at the heart of the matter, we find
really two basic concepts relied upon by the Commissionthe sales factor and the depletion base. ' 2 Although the
two concepts have been somewhat interwoven by the
Commission and the decision itself is far short of being
"clear and cogent" we will attempt to discuss each alleged
justification separately:
'67See Findings of Fact Nos. 12 through 16 inclusive. Our basic
response is that, although Utah mining and post-mining operations
are indeed impressive, these matters are all fairly reflected in the
factors of the formula. Production is reflected in sizeable capital
investment (the property factor) and in sizeable labor expenses (the
payroll factor).
sssee Finding of Fact No. 33.
'69 Tr. 293-94.
'°Findings of Fact, Nos. 17 through 24 inclusive.
11Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed.
991 ( 1942); Crawford Manufacturing Co. v. State Commission of
Revenue and Taxation, 180 Kan. 352, 304 P.2d 504 (1956); Western
Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah 2d 23, 414 P.2d
579 (1966).
12Findings of Fact Nos. 42, 54 and 55; Conclusions of Law Nos. 3,
13, and 16 through 20, inclusive.
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THE SALES FACTOR
AB this court is well aware, Kennecott does not sell
any appreciable percentage of its mine products in Utah.
Thus, although the payroll and property factors are comparatively large, the sales factor for Utah is virtually nil.
The Tax Commission seems to place undue significance
on this and would have us believe that this is a phenomenal and unique situation.' 3 To the contrary, it is the
customary method of operation of virtually all interstate
producing businesses. We cite, for example, U.S. Steel at
Geneva, which sells a very high percentage of its products
outside Utah, or Eimco, or others." Likewise, the Ford
Motor Company in Michigan sells probably a very high
percentage of its automobiles outside Michigan in states
such as Utah. The net result of all this is that the sales
are subject to taxation somewhere even though not in the
state of production. Indeed, since Utah is more of a consuming state than a producing one, it benefits quite substantially from allocating sales to destination for tax purposes. 75

Another background matter of some significance is
that, so far as allocation of sales is concerned, the Uni73See Conclusion of Law No. 13 wherein the Commission refers
to the "particular method of operation." It is to be further noted that
Kennecott's sales factor for Utah under prior law, was also virtually
nil and this result was approved by this Court in its 1956 decision
in favor of Kennecott in this matter. Kennecott Copper Corp. u. State
Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d 306 at 317; 301 P.2d 562 at 569 (1956)

1•See Testimony of Mr. 0. C. Madsen (Tr. 210).
75House Study at 541.
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form Act as adopted in Utah varies from that adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. Section 16 of Uniform Act provides as follows:
"Section 16. Sales of tangible personal property
are in this state if: (a) the property is delivered
or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United
States government, within this state regardless of
the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale; or
(b) the property is shipped from an office, store,
warehouse, factory, or other place of storage in this
state and (1) the purchaser is the United States
government or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable in
the state of the purchaser."
The Utah Act, however, excludes all of subparagraph (b)
of the Model Act provision. 76 This intentional deletion
by the Utah Legislature must be construed as a clear
legislative intention to allocate sales to the point of delivery whether or not taxed by the consumer state.
The Commission entered the following finding:> and
conclusions which bear upon the sales factor:

* * *

FINDINGS OF FACT

* * *

"42. Kennecott's actual gross receipts from its
Utah operations are much greater than are reported in its computation of the sales factor fraction. This is because Section 59-13-92, UCA, 1953
includes in the numerator of the fraction 'sales of
the taxpayer in this state.' The Utah Act is silent
with regard to whether sales shipped to a pur1sUTAH CODE

ANN. § 59-13-93 (Supp. 1969).
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chaser outside the state are deemed to be 'in this
State' even though the Model Act would require
such sales to be included in the numerator of the
fraction if the taxpayer 'is not taxable in the state
of the purchaser.'
43. Averaging the actual gross receipts from the
Utah operation in the percentage fractions for the
years in question, it is apparent that approximately
41.71 % of Kennecott's business activity, as determined by property, payroll and gross receipts or
sales in the year 1967 resulted from its Utah operations. In addition, approximately 33.31 % of Kennecott's business activity as determined by the
same factors resulted from its Utah activity in
1968."
* * *
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
* * *
3. The gross receipts from sales of Utah property
delivered or shipped to purchasers outside this
state are within the jurisdiction of the State of
Utah for tax purposes and may be included within
the deficiency assessments herein upon a proper
showing that the allocation and apportionment provisions of Section 59-13-78 et seq., UCA, 1953, do
not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayers
business activity.
* * *
13. Because of Kennecott's particular method of
operation and the fact that Section 59-13-93, UCA,
1953 is different from Section 16 of the Model
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes· Act,
in that sales which might be assigned to Utah under the Model Act may not be assignable to this
state under Section 59-13-93, we conclude that a
reasonable allocation of income to the State of
Utah will not result by applying the three factor

allocation formula established in Section 59-13-86
to the consolidated returns filed by Kennecott
herein. For these reasons, the statutory formula
method of allocating income need not be followed
by the Commission, but other adjustments may be
made as provided by Franchise Tax Regulation
No. 8, Paragraph 3."
As read in the context of the total decision, it is apparent
that these findings and conclusions form the commission's major, if not sole justification for departure from
the formula. (See particularly, Conclusion of Law No. 13).
In its Conclusion of Law No. 13 and Finding of Fact
No. 42, the commission seems to be saying that since
the Utah act is different than the Model Act regarding
sales allocation, and since Kennecott delivers a high percentage of its product out of state, the commission is
somehow justified in deviating from the formula. This is
a classic nonsequiter. First, the mere fact that the Utah
act differs from the Model Act in no way suggests that the
legislature intended to give the Ta." Commission broader
discretion in deviating from the formula. Secondly, if anything, this difference between the Model and Utah acts,
of which the Utah Legislature was well aware at the time
it adopted the Uniform Act, dictates against, rather than
for, a deviation from the formula based on the destination
sales phenomenon since it is clear what the legislature
intended regarding allocation of sales. Moreover, if the
Commission's reasoning were carried to its logical conclusion, it would mean that any company which produces
its product in one state but sells in others would be subjected to a deviation from the formula. This would result

61
in widespread havoc, not to mention a complete loss of
uniformity. The significant point, it would seem, is that
the attribution of sales is a legislative decision. Our legislature could presumably have enacted a law attributing
sales to the place of manufacture or mining. •1 For good
reasons (since Utah no doubt benefits overall from the
destination concept) 08 our legislature adopted the destination standard. At the time of adoption, both it and the
Commission were certainly aware that Kennecott and
other large producing companies in Utah would have an
infinitesimal sales factor in Utah. 79 It is not up to the Tax
Commission, at this juncture, to question and overrule
that legislative judgment.
The Tax Commission is attempting to do here what it
has sought and failed to achieve in three previous cases.
11 According to the House Study at 187: "Seven states use some
form of the origin concept in assigning sales." Those include Alabama
and Idaho where "sales are included in the numerator if the goods
were manufactured, mined, purchased or processed within the state."
1sHouse Study at 541.
79Jn fact, there was a specific discussion on the floor of the Senate
regarding the Act's applicability to various large companies, including
Kennecott. On January 24, 1967, the following discussion took place.
"QUESTION: Revenue-wise, can we expect a change in
allocation from some interstate corporations paying more
corporate franchise tax and some less, but with the substantial change in the total picture of the corporations, what
corporations are you talking about?
WELCH: I just discussed this with Mr. Paul Holt who is
in charge of this Division in the State Tax Commission and
he points out two or three suggestions. One would be J. C.
Penney Company, for example, which has business in very
manv states in the United States. The U.S. Steel Company
has business here and has it in other places, and I suppose
Kennecott, your employer, has business in this state and
other states."

In California Packing,8° the same issue came up and the
court held that there was no justification for deviating
from the formula. Again, in the second Kennecott case, 81
the Commission sought to include sales in the Utah
numerator even though they were executed through an
agent in New York. The court's discussion regarding the
sales factor is clearly pertinent to the instant case:

"It is true that the tax here sought to be exacted
is a tax upon the privilege of doing business within
this State and not a property tax; but the value
of that privilege is measured by a percentage comparison of three property factors, here and elsewhere, and the numerators of the fractions used
in the computation must be properly within the
jurisdiction of the taxing state. The point is clearly
illustrated with reference to tangible property; the
Kennecott property in New York could not be included in the numerator of the first fraction since
its permanent situs is established outside of this
State.
The situs of intangible property, however, appears
to present a more difficult problem. Sales, as an
intangible, may have the situs set by statute, and
state statutes have attributed sales to the place
of manufacture, mining or origination of the goods,
the place of destination of shipment to the purchaser, location of stock of goods from which the
order was appropriated, or the location of the sales
office handling the transaction, such as the Utah
statute under consideration. Presumably, the
socalifomia Packing Co. v. State Tax Commission, 97 Utah 307,

383, 83 P.2d 463, 470 ( 1939).

s1Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d
306, 301 P.2d 562 (1956).
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Legislature might localize the business situs of
intangible property in another manner than it has
chosen, but it must be in relation to some attribute of the intangible occurring in the taxing state.
Maytag Co. v. CommU5sioner of Taxation, 218
Mmn. 460, 17 N.W. 2d 37.
By U.C.A. 1943, 80-13-21 (6) (3) (1st), supra, the
Utah Legislature localized .the situs of sales as
factors in the computation of franchise tax to the
location of the sales office primarily responsible
for the sale, and excluded from the computation
sales negotiated or effected in behalf of the taxpayer by agents or agencies chiefly situated at,
connected with, or sent out from premises for the
transaction of business owned or rented by the
taxpayer or by his agents or agencies outside the
State.

* * *
On this part of the case we reverse those portions
of the Commission's findings and conclusions which
attribute sales to Utah where no taxable event
occurs within this State under the definition of
business situs of sales adopted by the Legislature."82 (Emphasis added.)
What this court pointed out quite articulately in
that decision is that the attribution or allocation of sales
is a legislative function. Within constitutional limits, the
legislature is free to allocate sales any way it wants to.
It is not up to the Tax Commission to change the legislative enactment, nor to apply the relief provisions of the
Uniform Act merely because the sales factor is allocated
outside the State of Utah. Again, there is nothing
825 Utah 2d at 316, 301 P.2d at 568.
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unique or "particular" about Kennecott's method of
doing business. This court should not now permit the
Commission, through this tortuous approach, to overrule
the court's earlier decision in favor of Kennecott on
the sales factor issue.
Likewise, in Western Contracting, the Tax Commission sought to deviate from the formula due to the sales
factor. We quote from the appropriate portion of the
Western Contracting decision:
"In the instant case, the Tax Commission further
contends that an application of the statutory formula is inequitable because, in ,the gross receipts'
factor, none of the plaintiff's sales are apportionable to Utah.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the
California Packing case, observed that the purpose
of the three-factor formula was to provide a rough
but equitable method of making a proper allocation, and if .one factor tended to allocate a disporportionate amount of net income, the other
factors tended to compensate for this matter.
In Butler Bros. u. McColgan, the California Supreme Court elaborated on this issue and stated
that to rebut the presumption of the fairness of the
formula, there must be clear and cogent evidence
directed to each element of the equation to prove
that the assumed relation among the various factors produced an erroneous result. 83 (Emphasis
added)
This discussion points clearly to the basic failure of the
Tax Commission in the instant case. They have premised
8318 Utah 2d at 34, 414 P.2d at 587.
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their whole attack on one factor and one factor only-that
being the sales factor. They have produced no evidence
whatsoever with respect to any alleged irregularities or
inequities regarding either the property or payroll factors.
The Western Contracting decision makes it quite clear
(as did Butler Bros. u. McColgan and California Packing
before it) , that it is not enough to produce evidence as to
one factor only, but "clear and cogent evidence" must be
produced "directed to each element of the equation" to
prove that the assumed relation among the various factors
produced an erroneous result.
As we read Western Contracting, even if the Commission could prove that there was something wrong with the
sales factor (which it has not done) such proof would be
inadequate justification for departure from the formula
since proof must be presented as to each element rather
than merely one element of the equation.
Some comments should be made regarding Finding
of Fact No. 43 wherein the Commission has taken gross
receipts from .the depletion schedule, and plugged them
back into the numerator of the sales fraction, thereby
coming up with 41 % allocation in 1967 and 31 % in 1968.
The trouble with this reasoning, and result, as indicated
in the foregoing analysis, is simply that it completely disregards the express language of the law governing the sales
factor. In this finding, the state has apparently determined that sales which are delivered outside of the State
of Utah are "business activity" inside the State of Utah
and thereby concludes they can be included in the numer-
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ator portion of the Utah sales fraction. As we comprehend
Finding of Fact No. 43, all it really means is that if you
takes sales delivered outside the State of Utah and through
some legerdemain, reallocate those sales to the State of
Utah, (notwithstanding the clear legislative intent to the
contrary), it results in a much higher percentage. While
this is no doubt true, it only begs the obvious and does not
provide any justification for deviating from the formula.
Referring to Conclusion of Law No. 3, in comparison
with Conclusion of Law No. 13, we have a delightful bit
of circuitous and self-serving reasoning. Conclusion No.
3 says that the gross receipts from sales delivered outside
the State of Utah are subject to the jurisdiction of the
State of Utah. This statement is incomprehensible inasmuch as the legislature has clearly indicated to the contrary, and this court in three decisions (California Packing, the second Kennecott case, and Western Contracting)
has held to the contrary. Although, again, it is far less than
"clear and cogent" we believe that the reasoning of the
Tax Commission as set forth in the findings and conclusions quoted above may be reduced to the following syllogism:
-Sales may be allocated back to Utah if the relief
provisions are applied (Conclusion of Law No. 3);
-The relief provisions may be applied because sales
are allocated outside Utah (Conclusion of Law No.
13);
-Therefore, since sales are allocated outside Utah,
sales may be allocated inside Utah.
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This is an interesting bit of circuitous reasoning supported
only by its own bootstraps.
In concluding our discussion on the sales factor, some
mention should be made of the mischief which would result
from adopting the Commission's theory regarding sales.
The House Study8 4 makes it very clear that there was good
reason for the Utah Legislature to adopt a destination
sales factor. Expressed as a percentage of the tax base,
the following information is set forth:

Utah Tax Base
Two Factor Formula (payroll & property) =100%
Three Factor Formula (sales allocated
to origin) ---------------------------------------------------- = 104 %
Three Factor Formula (sales allocated
to destination) ------------····----·······-···-------·= 109%
In short, Utah (being a market state) does much better
by having a three factor formula with sales allocated to
destination. If the Tax Commission should prevail on its
theory here, we see no logical reason why Ford Motor,
General Motors, Westinghouse, or anyone else could not
demand that they be given special treatment and avoid
taxation in Utah because most of their property and payroll are located elsewhere.
Moreover, it seems rather anomalous that when Utah
is attempting so valiantly to bring new industry into the
state, it would adopt a tax theory which discourages producers and manufacturers from locating in the state. For
B4House Study at 541.

1
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example, why should a major chemical company want to
build a plant in Utah only to find that, when most of its
sales are outside of Utah, the Tax Commission is going to
find justification in deviating from the formula and extracting a disproportionate amount of tax?
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's
holding regarding the application of the relief provisions
based upon the sales factor is wholly insufficient as a
matter of law.

THE DEPLETION BASE
Another factor which is mentioned frequently in
the Findings of Fact has to do with the comparison of
Kennecott's depletion figures with the net income allocated through the formula to the State of Utah. We
question whether this is significant from the standpoint
of the Commission's actual decision to depart from the
formula and utilize the relief provisions of the Uniform
Act, inasmuch as Conclusion of Law No. 13 would seem
to place sole and exclusive reliance upon the sales factor
phenomenon, to the exclusion of all other alleged justifications. However, because much verbiage is devoted to
the depletion comparison, we deem it appropriate to discuss this for whatever relevance it may have.

In numerous findings, the Commission has alluded
to the comparison between the depletion computations
and the net income allocated to Utah as contained in the
tax returns as filed. Predominant among these are Findings of Fact Nos. 36, 37, 41, and 46. Apparently, the Commission is concerned about the disparity between the fig-
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ure reported as "taxable income from the property" in
the depletion schedules (See, for example, Schedule "N"
of Exhibit "B"), and the net income allocated to the
State of Utah (See, for example, line 25 of page 1 of Exhibit "B"). We submit that this comparison is quite
meaningless and legally quite irrelevant.
In the first place, it should be pointed out that the
computation of depletion is a specialized concept consisting
of a separate accounting method utilized to determine the
value of minerals depleted from the mine. In making this
determination, the law requires the company to found its
depletion base upon the first marketable product coming
out of the mine. In this instance, that product is copper
concentrate. Since the concentrates are not, in fact,
marketed as such, Kennecott must utilize the so-called
"work back" method in computing depletion. Through
this method, it starts with gross sales of its products, subtracts post-mining and concentrating costs and profits,
subtracts mining costs, and arrives at a figure known as
the depletable base. 85 The depletable base is not at all
synonymous with or comparable to net income for purposes of taxation. Please refer, for example, to the Tax
Commission's Regulation No. 12, which discusses the
method of computing depletion. This regulation provides:
"In general, gross income from the property is
the crude mineral product or concentrates, if sold,
or the market or field price of such crude mineral
S5See specifically the testimony of Mr. R. L. Ward, Comptroller
of Kennecott Copper Corporation, wherein he explained in detail
the method of computation of depletion (Tr. 102-08).

70

or product or concentrates, if further processed
prior to sale. Net income from the proprety must
be computed by deducting from gross income from
the property all deductions allowed by statute
in computing taxable net income (excluding any
allowance for depletion) to the extent that they
are applicable to the property." (Emphasis added.)
There is no formulary apportionment involved in the depletion computations themselves, as there is in the computation of net income assignable to Utal1 for tax purposes. Moreover, there are various deductions made for
the net income computation which may not be made
for purposes of the depletion computation, inasmuch
as they are not "applicable to .the property" in the terms
of Regulation 12. As an example, the taxpayer expends a
great deal of money (as indicated by the returns) as
interest expense on indebtedness. Such deductions may
not be "applicable to the property" and may not, therefore, be properly deductible in the depletion computations.
Likewise, research projects are carried on for Chase Brass
& Copper Company having to do with fabrication techniques. These expenses are not "applicable to the property" and would not be properly deductible from the
standpoint of depletion, although they would be proper
deductions in computing net income for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, the depletion computations do not take
into effect the unitary characteristics of the consolidated
group, or the contributions made by various other operations elsewhere, or the losses incurred at operations else. where. Thus, it is not only possible but highly probable
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in a company as large as Kennecott and its consolidated
group, that you may have a very large figure for taxable
income from the property, and yet even show a loss on
net income for tax purposes. We cite as an excellent
example of this situation, the deficiency assessment itself,
which shows on schedule No. 8 (involving Peabody Coal
Company) , net income subject to depletion for Peabody
of over $6 million, whereas, there is a net loss allocated to
the State of Utah of $517.80. This appears from the Tax
Commission's own deficiency assessment. The Tax Commission has apparently thought there was nothing unusual
or strange about this situation and, likewise, we submit
there is nothing unusual or strange about the disparity
between the Utah Copper Division depletion computations and the net income allocated to the State of Utah.
To place the matter in somewhat simpler perspective,
and to point out clearly the incomparability of depletion
base on the one hand, and allocated net income on the
other, we might use as a hypothetical example a company
which operates within the State of Utah, a series of retail
clothing stores, and a uranium mine. Let us further assume that this corporation makes a good profit on its
uranium mine, but is losing comparatively more money on
its retail clothing stores. Under these circumstances, this
company would have a high figure for net income from the
property for computation of depletion (since it is making
money on the mine) , but would show an overall loss. due
to the unprofitable operations of the retail clothing stores.
Similarly, when you take a company the size of Kennecott
with its consolidated group and consider the far-flung
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extent of its activities, there is nothing amazh'1g about the
fact that depletion does not equal net income assigned
through the formula.
But going one step further, even if the two figures
were comparable, the comparison is legally irrelevant, because the depletion computation is essentially an accounting computation which does not involve formulary apportionment, whereas, net income assignable to Utah has
been computed in strict compliance with the Uniform Act
and through the use of the three-factor formula. It has
long been the rule of this state and elsewhere that when
discussing a unitary business (as the Commission has held
Kennecott and its affiliates to be) , separate acccounting
may not be used to impeach the results of the statutory
formula. In other words, the mere fact that separate
accounting would produce more money than that produced
by the formula is not adequate justification for deviating
from the formula. 'This is true because separate accounting is a grossly inappropriate method for computing the
income of a unitary business.
The authorities uniformly support the foregoing proposition. We should start by quoting from the Tax Commission's own regulations (Regulation No. 8 effective in
1956):
"There is a strong presumption that the application
of a statutory method of assigning net income will
produce a reasonable allocation of net income within and without this state, and it must be used in all
cases except those in which the Tax Commission
has determined that an exception should be made.
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It should be emphasized that the statutory method

may produce an income assignment substantially

different from that produced by some other method
(such as segregated accounting) but that fact clone
is not sufficient to justify an exception. It must be
shown that the factors of the formula, when applied
to the particular business at hand could not be
expected to produce a reasonable allocation because of variance from normal situations with respect to property, wages and salaries, receipts,
rents, interest, dividends, etc., sufficient to invalidate the assumption of a reasonable allocation."
(Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court of Utah, as recently as the
Western Contracting decision has also made very clear
the inappropriateness of separate computations. In Western Contracting, separate accounting would have produced
far greater net income than the formula, yet the court
refused to allow the Tax Commission to deviate from the
formula. Indeed, the court reiterated the sound proposition that separate accounting does not impeach formulary apportionment. Referring with approval to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Butler Bros. 86
this court stated:
"The court observed that it need not impeach the
separate accounting system used by the appellant
to say that it does not prove its assertion that extra
territorial values are being taxed, for the results
of the accounting system employed by appellant do
not impeach the validity or propriety of the formula
which California has applied here." 87
86315 U.S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 at 996 (1942).
8718 Utah 2d 23 at 29.
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Going one step further, we point out the obviousin virtually every decision involving the propriety of the
three factor formula, a situation exists where separate
accounting will produce grossly disparate results as compared to those produced by the formula. If this were not
true, there would be no contest. In Western Contracting, 88
Butler Bros. 89 , Superwr Oil,'10 Honolulu Oil91 and virtually
every other case dealing with the formula of which we are
aware, it was shown by the opponent of the formula
that separate accounting would produce a grossly different
result than that produced by the formula. The courts,
however, have uniformly refused to utilize separate accounting for a unitary business since it is a misleading
method for allocating income of such a business. The
authorities are uniformly in accord that separate accounting is hopelessly inadequate to determine the proper
amount of income allocable to a state for tax purposes
when dealing with a unitary corporation. We quote from
the decision of the Supreme Court of California in the
leading case of Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P. 2d 334 at
336 (1941):

"It is only if its business within this state is truly
separate and distinct from its business without this
state, so that the segregation of income may be
made clearly and accurately, that the separate accounting method may properly be used."
We quote also from the Crawford Manufacturing Comss13 Utah 2d 23, 414 P.2d 579 (1966)
8"315 U.S. EOl, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L.Ed. 991 (1942)
9034 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P.2d 33 (1963).
9134 Cal. Rptr. 552, 386 P.2d 40 (1963).
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pany case 02 which was relied upon heavily by this court

in the Western Contracting decision:

"Because of the taxpayer's unitary character, the
separate accounting method did not clearly reflect
the net income attributable to a state and that
income to be allocated must be calculated by the
three factor formula method."
The other authorities supporting this proposition are plethoric. 9"
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that to the
extent that the decision of the Tax Commission may be
92 Crawford Manufacturing Co. v. State Commission of Revenue
and Taxation, 180 Kan. 352, 304 P.2d 504 (1956).

03 See cases cited at footnotes 88 through 91, supra. Other authorities have also recognized the principal that, for a unitary business
separate accounting does not impeach formulary apportionment:

In Household Finance Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 565 at 567 (1964), the Supreme Court of California denied taxpayer's use of separate accounting:
"Implicit in plaintiff's argument is the view that an allocation formula may be resorted to only when separate accounting is impossible or not reasonably feasible. But that view has
been flatly rejected. . . .
Rather, if plaintiff's income is derived from or attributable
to sources both within and without the Sltate . . . then an
allocation of total net income would naturally follow from
the mandatory language of (the statute) and a separate accounting could not be approved ....".
Another authority in commenting on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Butler Bros., (315 U.S. 501 (1942)) observed:
"Its holding must be read as a conclusion that separate
accounting is inherently incapable of impeaching an apportionment formula." Beaman, PAYING TAXES TO
OTHER STATES, 3-18 (1963); Keesling and Warren,
California's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 156 at 167-74 (1967).

76

based upon the comparison between the separate accounting figures shown in our depletion computations, and the
net income assignable to Utah, such comparison is a completely inadequate basis upon which to justify a deviation
from the statutory formula. The authorities uniformly
agree that separate accounting does not impeach the
formula, and that separate accounting is a wholly inadequate method to constitutionally compute taxable income
for a unitary business. Moreover, in view of the fact that
this particular separate accounting computation is one
for depletion, it is not in any way comparable with net
income for tax purposes.
OTHER FACTORS
There are various other comments in the decision
d the Tax Commission which may pertain to the allocation issue. It is difficult to tell to what extent the Commission has relied upon these factors in coming to its
conclusion that the relief provisions should be applied.
However, we should at least take notice of the more
significant of these.
(a)

The Unitary Business Concept-

The Tax Commission has found that Kennecott and
its affiliates constitute a unitary business (See Conclusion
of Law No. 4). The Tax Commission then goes on to find
(Conclusion of Law No. 5) that whether or not Kennecott
is unitary is irrelevant to the question of whether the relief provisions should be applied. This conclusion is in direct conflict with the Commission's own Regulation No. 8
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which expressly requires that the statutory apportionment
formula method of allocating income be applied when a
business is unitary. In view of this regulation, as well as
the cases cited herein, the burden of proof as to whether
or not the formula should be utilized is affected quite substantially by the unitary business question. For example,
if a company's operations were truly separate and distinct
from those located outside the state, it would seem that
the burden in deviating from the formula might be relatively minimal. Indeed, under such circumstances, separate accounting may well be the preferable approach. However, where the operations are clearly unitary, the party
opposing the formula carries all of the burdens set forth in
Western Contracting and the various cases which it follows, such as Butler Bros. v. M cColgan.
(b) The Prior Kennecott DecisionsIn Conclusion of Law No. 10, the Tax Commission
purports to justify its deviation from the Uniform Act
through the two previous Kennecott cases which have peen
heard and decided by this court. The issues raised in the
instant case were not presented or decided in either of the
previous cases with respect to allocation. In the first
case, Kennecott Copper Corporatwn v. State Tax Commission, 118 Utah 140, 221 P.2d 857 (1951), the company
had filed its returns in the name of Utah Copper Division
of Kennecott, following the format of the predecessor,
Utah Copper Company. Then during the course of iitigation, Kennecott attempted to change and use a corporate apportionment approach. The Tax Commission denied
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the Company this right, and the Supreme Court majority
affirmed, saying that under the circumstances, this
was not an abuse of discretion. It is quite clear that the
court did not intend to hold in that case that Kennecott
was bound perpetually to this method of filing on a divisional basis; the ruling was simply that where Kennecott
had already filed on that basis the Commission acted reasonably when in the course of redetermination of a deficiency assessment it required the taxpayer not to deviate
from the method utilized in the original filing then under
review. We quote the court in this respect (118 Utah
151):
"The problem that concerns us here is not that the
Commission seeks to force the taxpayer to a nonstatutory basis. On the contrary, the Commission
has permitted the taxpayer to file on a basis selected by it which the taxpayer seeks to change
because the amount of tax has become erroneous.
Such a request may be entirely legitimate, but
when as here there are factors which cannot be determined with any degree of satisfaction, the request is made some six years after the tax has accrued and the only reason assigned is that the
change may substantially reduce tax liability, the
showing is not sufficient to convince us that the
Commission was arbitrary and capricious in denying the request. The petitioner's contention in this
respect is overruled." (Emphasis added)

In the second case, Kennecott Copper Corporation v.
State Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d 306, 301 P.2d 562
(1956), the question was not even presented to the court.
As is clearly indicated on the schedule of comparative
figures (5 Utah 2d 310), both Kennecott and the Com-
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mission continued to treat the Utah Copper Division as it
was then (about 21 years ago) as if it were the taxable
entity. The returns were filed in that way, and no attempt
was made by Kennecott to use consolidated apportionment as it now has done for the years 1967 and 1968,
nor was any attempt then made by Kennecott to seek
permission for corporate apportionment as vainly sought
for the years now in litigation. The questions presented
in the 1956 case dealt with the sales factor and depletion
and did not at all concern consolidated or corporate apportionment under the new Uniform Act which became
effective on January 1, 1967. Indeed, the court noted that
this was a "somewhat unique" situation (5 Utah 2d at
315), in view of the fact that Kennecott was a New York
corporation.
Finally, it should be noted again that the last litigated
tax year in connection with which this court issued
a decision was 1950. The testimony of Mr. Madsen and
Mr. Ward made it clear that there have been numerous and substantial changes in the taxpayer's basic operations since 1950. The auditing division has offered no
evidence to contradict any of the testimony as to changes
given by these witnesses. Hence, no decision based upon
the factual situation of that year could be considered res
judicata or binding with respect to the current situation
some twenty years later.

CONCLUSION AS TO ALLOCATION
We are constrained to believe, and therefore, respectfully submit to this court that there is indeed but one

"justification" for the deviation from the Uniform Act
which has been attempted by the Tax Commission in this
proceeding-the production of greater tax revenues; Mr.
Holt's testimony is to this effect.'' 1 The entire body of case
law and authority on this subject is replete with the need
for uniformity, and the compelling reasons which must
be shown for deviating from the Uniform formula. The
burden of proof is well defined. Rather than producing
"clear and cogent evidence directed to each element of
the equation," the Tax Commission has relied upon a
hodge podge of irrelevancies. The decision itself is incomprehensible on this question. At no place in the decision will one find a reasonable or clear explanation of
why the Tax Commission is justified in deviating from
the formula. Even a cursory analysis of the decision reveals that there is no logic or relevance to any of the alleged justifications for deviation. The decision of the
Tax Commission, to the extent that it authorizes deviation
from the three factor formula as outlined in the Uniform
Act, must be reversed.
9 4 See

Tr. 289, where the following colloquy took place:

"QUESTION: But in any event, it is your testimony that
the reason the audit deficiency was proposed is because the
taxpayer in 1967 departed from the previous method of filing
and the agreement, as I understand it?
ANSWER: That is right, we first became aware that they
deviated from their prior agreement when the return for
1967 was filed approximately on October 15th, 1968. So, at
that time, we became concerned because of the revenue impact on the State of Utah. So that then we spent considerable
time after that going into the problem, and then we waited
until they had filed their return for the year 1968." (Emphasis added.)
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POINT III
THE TAX COMMISSION DECISION SUBJECTS THE TAXPAYER TO PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAXATION IN VIOLATION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
(ARTICLE I, SECTION 2), AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
The requirement that corporate income be apportioned among the states finds its origin in the United
States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
has held in numerous decisions that both the Commerce
Clause95 and the Due Process Clause96 forbid taxation by a
state beyond that which is properly attributed to a fair
measure of the activities in the state. 97
Because of the constitutional ramifications of this
case and the clearly interstate characteristics of the Taxpayer, it is imperative that national rather than parochial
criteria be employed to test the validity of the instant
assessment. Reasonably current statistics reveal that some
forty states have a corporation tax either directly on or
measured by corporate net income. Of those, thirty-five
have adopted the three-part allocation formula consisting
95U. S. CONST., Art. I, Section 8, cl. 3.
ssu. S. CONST., Amendment XIV.
97For excellent background discussion of the constitutional principles and precedents see: Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State
Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of a Unitary Business,
21 NAT'L. TAX J. 487-492 (1968); G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION, Chapter II (1946).
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of property, payroll and sales. Over twenty-two of those
states have adopted substantially the provisions of the
U.D.I.T.P.A. 98 A strong movement toward uniformity exists, and the courts have increasingly expanded the unitary concept to justify the use of the three-factor formula
and to denounce, as wholly inappropriate to a unitary
business, separate accounting. 99
There can be no serious question that the Tax Commission has allocated far more income to Utah than is
properly allocable under the formula. By way of comparison, we note the following:
INCOME ALWCATED TO UTAH
3 Factor Formula Hybrid Method 100

Difference

1967 ______________ $4,645,102

$18,585,435

$13,940,333

1968 ______________ $7,763,136

$28,141,464

$20,378,328

Thus, the Tax Commission is claiming almost four times
the amount of income it should have under the formulaor, for the two years in question, over $34 million in excess
of the formula results.
We pose what we believe is the key constitutional
98J_

HEl.LERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 347 (1968).

99Western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission of Utah,
18 Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966); Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 60 Cal 2d 406, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P. 2d 33 (1963);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd
315 U. S. 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).
100This consists of a variety of methods used by the Commission
including separate accounting, formula, and combination of the two
(See POINT IV).
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question-Is there anything which would prevent other
states fror.1 taxing that $34 million? Kennecott or its subsidiaries do business in virtually every state in the Union.
Some thirty-five of those states have the three-factor
formula. What argument could Kennecott make in those
states to prevent them from taxing the $34 million? It
might be argued that Kennecott and its affiliates are not
unitary and thus the Butler Bros. rationale is inappropriate. It must be expected that such an argument would be
rejected. Indeed, the Utah State Tax Commission and
the California Court of Appeals have both held that they
are unitary. The latter ruling has been allowed to stand
by the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed
an appeal. 101 The California decision was simple and
straightforward:
"When a corporation engages in multistate business, including business in California, and the
business is unitary, there must be an allocation of
income by formula. 102 (Emphasis added.)
In view of the foregoing, courts in New Mexico, Nevada,
New York, and other states can certainly be expected to
reach a similar conclusion.
The fact that Utah's claims are seriously at variance
with the taxing powers of the other states has dramatic
constitutional significance. The United States Supreme
Court has recently considered a highly analogous situation
101Chase Brass and Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 7 Cal.
App. 3rd 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970), appeal dismissed and cert. dedenied, 27 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1970).
10286 Cal. Rptr. 350 at 352.
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in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia. 103 There,
the District of Colwnbia had .adopted a single factor
(sales) formula, to which General Motors, having substantial sales but no other business activity in the District of Colwnbia, objected. Although the Supreme Court
declined to decide the case on constitutional grounds, it
cannot be seriously questioned that the case has clear
constitutional value. 104 The Court observed that the single
factor approach was "an apportionment formula seriously
at variance with those prevailing in the vast majority
of states and creates substantial dangers of multiple
taxation."
The Court took notice of the wide acceptance by the
states of the three factor approach 105 and concluded:
"In any case, the sheer inconsistency of the Dis-

trict formula with that generally prevailing may
tend to result in the unhealthy fragmentation of
enterprise and an uneconomic pattern of plant location, and so presents an added reason why this
Court must give proper meaning to the revelant
provision of the District Code.
Moreover, the result reached in this case is consistent with the concern which the Court has
shown that state taxes imposed on income from
interstate commerce be fairly apportioned."' 06 (Emphasis added.)
103330 U. S. 553, 85 S. Ct. 1156, 14 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1965).
104Qne author has observed: "[T] he ... case was not decided on
constitutional grounds-that is, if we are to take the Court's word
for what it was deciding, which may not necessarily reflect the springs
of the decision." J. HELLERSTEIN, supra, note 98 at 492.
1osAt that time, only 26 states used the three factor approach as
opposed to 35 now.
106380 U. S. at 560, 14 L. Ed. 2d at 73.

85
It requires no extension of General Motors to observe

that the Utah State Tax Commission has adopted a completely inconsistent method for taxation, the net result of
which is to create substantial dangers of multiple taxation
and inequities.
This is not to say that a state may never vary from
the formula, but, as a minimum guideline, it would seem
that there should be extremely clear reasons for so doingreasons which are sufficiently clear that they would be
persuasive in another state. No doubt this is the rationale
of the requirement articulated by the Supreme Courts of
Utah101 and the United States 108 that evidence in opposition to the formula must be "clear and cogent" or "clear
and convincing."
Taxpayer did not present evidence that it, in fact,
paid taxes on more than 1003 of its income. However,
actual double taxation is unnecessary from both substantive and constitutional viewpoints. The U.D.I.T.P.A. is
based on the sound premise that if a corporation is subject to taxation in another state, even though not taxed,
that is sufficient. We quote Professor Pierce, one of the
draftsman of the Act:
"Throughout the uniform act it is assumed that
every state in which the taxpayer is doing business
levies an income tax, whether it does so in fact or
does not. Thus, income is attributable to those
states which do not have an income tax if the
101Western Contracting Corp.
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).

v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah'

10BButler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334 (1941),
affd. 315 U. S, 501, 62 S. Ct. 701, 86 L. Ed. 991 (1942).

86
taxpayer would be subjected to such a tax in that
state, if lawfully adopted in that state. In states
not having income taxes or taxes measured by net
income, other types of franchise taxes are usually
imposed. Income is justifiably attributable to these
states since these other taxes substitute for the income tax, and it must be recognized that these
other states may change their tax structures at any
time. In several sections of the uniform act, reference is made to the allocation and apportionment
of income on the basis of whether the taxpayer is
taxable in another state. Af3 we shall see, the question of allocating and apportioning with reference
to this concept of taxability assures that 100 percent of the income of a multistate business theoretically will be taxed by the several states. It is
this concept as used throughout the act that raises
the greatest number of objections from certain
taxpayers.m 09
This same philosophy is expressed in the comment to Section 3 of the Uniform Act as follows:
"Thus, if the corporation has its commercial domicile in state X, which has only a sales tax and no
tax measured by net income, but that corporation
has business activity in state A, which has this
apportionment Act, state A must apportion the
business income as provided in this Act so that
some of it is allocated to state X, even though as a
result of the tax system of state X, a portion of
the business income escapes income taxation. This
is desirable in order to treat the business of all
states equally, and in order to avoid having this
Act as a factor in inducing a state to have an income tax. If it does not wish to tax income, that
109Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXES 747, at 749 (1953).
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is no reason for a state which does wish to tax income to attempt to obtain more than its share of
taxable income."

In the instant case, we are confronted with far more
than the mere possibility of taxation by other states - in
view of the California case there exists a certainty that
both California and Utah are taxing the same income.
The California Court has held that Kennecott's income
(including naturally, the income produced through Utah
activities) can be taxed in California through use of the
combined return-unitary business concept and the threefactor formula. By definition, since Utah is claiming some
400% of the amount it would have under the formula, it
follows that California is also taxing some portion of the
300 % excess also claimed by Utah. The record likewise
demonstrates that New Mexico taxes the Company on
a three factor basis. 110 Again, Utah and New Mexico would
be taxing some of the same income.
This court in Western Contracting observed that if
each state taxed according to the formula, it would insure
that only 100% of a company's income would be taxed.111
The corollary is also quite true, i.e., if one state taxes a
company at 400% of the formula figure, it virtually insures that the 300% excess is subject to taxation, or actually taxed, elsewhere in one or more of the 35 states
which use the three factor formula.
In this case, the violation of the Commerce Clause
110Tr.

205.

1111s Utah 2d 23

at 31.
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of the United States Constitution is patent. The United
States Supreme Court has held that states are not allowed
"one single tax worth of direct interference with the free
flow of commerce."" 12 And yet, Kennecott, is being subjected to a 300% direct tax on some $34 million merely for
the fortuitious fact that it is in interstate commerce! If we
were to take a hypothetical group of corporations identical
in all respects to Kennecott and its affiliates, except that
they did only intrastate business in Utah, it is plain
that the hypothetical group would be subjected to less tax
than Kennecott is subjected to here on a cumulative
interstate basis. The resulting penalty of 300% is nothing
more or less than a tariff extracted for the privilege of
conducting an interstate business.

In conclusion, we do not claim that either the consolidated return statute or the Uniform Act relief provisions are unconstitutional on their face. Rather, it is respectfully submitted that the Tax Commission has erroneously construed and applied both of these legislative provisions in a way which results in a patently unconstitutional levy against the taxpayer. This construction and
application by the Commission violates the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, of the United States
Constitution. 113
112Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U. S. 450 (1959) quoting from Freeman V. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249
(1946).

1l3Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390 U.S. 317, 19 L.Ed. 2d 120, (1968).

POINT IV.
THE SUBSTITUTE METHOD IMPOSED BY
THE TAX COMMISSION IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
Hereinabove, we have pointed out why the Tax Commission should not be allowed to deviate from the three
factor formula. Even assuming, arguendo, that the relief
provisions should be applied, it is our second contention
that the substitute method adopted by the Tax Commission is wholly unreasonable and cannot be upheld by this
court. As a preface to this discussion, it should be observed that both of the parties to this litigation are desirous of arriving at some meaningful conclusions, through
this court, which will serve as a framework for resolving
the method in which future returns are to be filed. Indeed, one of the principal difficulties with the substitute
method adopted herein by the Commission is that it has
absolutely nothing to recommend it from the standpoint
of consistency, reasonableness, or adherence to any recognized methods of taxation. The method is ad hoc, it is
peculiar, and it cannot provide the basis for resolving any
future problems which may arise between the parties. Indeed, its only redeeming virtue (at least insofar as the
Tax Commission is concerned) is that it does produce
sizeable revenues.
A.

The Relief Provisions.

The relief provision of the Uniform Act (contained
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in UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §59-13-95 (Supp. 1969))' provides as follows:
"If the allocation and apportionment provisions of
this act do not fairly represent the extent of the
taxpayer's business activity in this state, the taxpayer may petition for, or the state tax commission
may require, in respect to all or any part of the
taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable;

(a) separate accounting;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this state; or
(d)
the employment of any other method to
effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income." (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, it is clear that even if the relief provisions are applicable, the Tax Commission is not free to substitute any
alternative method which, according to its whim and caprice, may produce additional tax revenues. Rather, the
method adopted must be "reasonable", and it must be
"equitable" when the Commission relies on subparagraph
(d) which it has done here. It also goes without saying
that it must be constitutional. We have pointed out above
that the substitute method fails to meet that criterion.

B. What the Commission has done.
It was pointed out hereinabove that the method
utilized by Kennecott in filing its returns was essentially
as follows:
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Consolidated net income was computed for all of the
affiliated corporations, in compliance with Regulation
No. 4 (12). A single allocation formula was utilized, incorporating the property, payroll and sales factors of all of
the affiliated corporations. The consolidated net income
was multiplied by the allocation percentage thus derived
resulting in net income allocated to Utah. (See Chart III,
supra.) In stark contrast to this approach, the Tax Commission has utilized several different methods to allocate
income for the affiliated corporations or divisions thereof.
As noted in POINT I, this was not done on a consolidated
basis but was done for each corporation or division separately:
(1) With respect to the Utah Copper Division of
Kennecott Copper Corporation, the Tax Commission has
extracted a figure from the depletion schedules referred
to as "net income from the property". As noted above,:
this is essentially a separate accounting figure utilized
for a specific and specialized purpose. This figure, with
minor adjustments, was then multiplied by a three-part
formula consisting of the property, payroll and sales of
Utah Copper Division only. Not surprisingly, 100% of
the property and 100% of the payroll of this hypothetical
taxpayer were allocated to Utah, and approximately 0%
of the sales were allocated, thus arriving at a net allocation percentage of 66%.
(2) The same general method was utilized for the
computation of Tintic Division's assignable net income.
A separate accounting figure was extracted from the de-
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pletion schedules, multiplied by a percentage arrived from
Tintic Division factors only, (approximately 75%). The
result being the income assigned to Utah.
With respect to Chase Brass and Copper Company,
Peabody Coal Company, Bear Creek Mining Company
(and also with respect to minor corporations such as Kennecott Communications Corporation), the Tax Commission has utilized the statutory three-part formula on a
corporate basis. Thus, for example, the Tax Commission
has taken the corporate net income of Chase Brass and
Copper Company and has multiplied that net income by
a three factor formula utilizing Chase Brass' property,
payroll and sales. This resulted in a separate computation
for each corporation of corporate net income allocated to
Utah.
As noted in POINT I, after the Tax Commission, using
various means, had computed separately the allocable net
income of Tintic and Utah Copper Divisions of Kennecott
Copper Corporation and the corporate allocable income
of the other affiliates, it then added up all of these allocated net income figures and applied the tax rate.

C. Specific areas of unreasonableness.
The following items which were utilized in the substitute methods, are among those which we submit are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and inequitable:
(1)

Unconsolidation -

As discussed more fully in POINT I hereinabove, the
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Commission has violated its own Regulation 4 (12); it has
violated the Consolidated Return Statute; and it has,
with no statutory or regulatory authority whatsoever, unconsolidated this taxpayer's return.
(2)

Deviation from the formu/,a-

As discussed more fully in POINT II hereinabove, the
Tax Commission has violated the mandatory language of
both the Uniform Act114 and its own regulations, 115 both of
which require that a unitary business must file in accordance with the three part statutory formula.
(3)

"Carving Out" the Utah Copper Division -

As noted above, the Tax Commission has disregarded
Kennecott Copper Corporation and has applied the three
part formula to only one branch of Kennecott - that
being the Utah Copper Division (the same general procedure was followed in connection with Tintic Division).
First, we question whether the relief provisions of the
Uniform Act could be construed as authorizing this type
of deviation from the norm. Please note that subsections
(a) , (b) and ( c) of the relief provisions deal with various
adjustments in the formula itself, or in the method of allocation. None of these sections talk in terms of basic
changes in the taxable entity, except possibly the separate
accounting alternative which is clearly not designed for a
unitary business. Subsection (d) which follows as a genn•UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §59-13-86 (Supp. 1969).

"C".

11scorporation Franchise Tax Regulation No. 8(2)-(3), Exhibit
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eral grant of authority, should, we submit, be construed
in connection with the rule of ejusdem generis and, therefore, should be limited to methods of adjustment within
the same general scope as those specified in subsections
(a), (b) and (c) . It is entirely questionable that the
type of hybrid separate accounting adopted by the Commission with respect to the Utah Copper Division could
be said to fall within the relief provisions. Indeed, there is
another section of the Uniform Act which purports to deal
more specifically with this question, and that is section
1(a) 116 We quote from the comment to section 1 as it is
found in the official draft of the Uniform Act itself (Exhibit "D"):
"The definition refers to 'the' taxpayer's trade or
business as if he had one business. It is not intended by this language to require a taxpayer having 'several' businesses to use the same allocation
and apportionment method for the businesses. The
language permits separate treatment of different
businesses of a single taxpayer. Section 18 clearly
permits separate treatment."
Thus, the question of whether or not one or many formulas
should be applied, resolves itself to the question of
whether there are one or several businesses involved. The
question of whether you have one or several businesses, in
tum, evolves into considerations very similar if not identical to the question of whether the business is unitary or
non-unitary. Thus, the Multistate Tax Commission'"!
116Section l(a) of the Uniform Act was adopted by the Utah Legislature in its exact form as UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §59-13-78(a).
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proposed regulations under the Uniform Act111 provide as
follows:
"One corporate entity may have more than one
'trade or business'. In such cases, it is necessary
to determine the business income attributable to
each separate trade or business. The income of
each business is then apportioned by an apportionment formula which take into consideration
the instate and outstate factors which relate to the
business the income of which is being apportioned.118
The regulations then go on to give examples. They indicate that a taxpayer might properly be considered as conducting separate businesses if it were a conglomerate engaged in various enterprises, including manufacture of
117 The Multistate Tax Commission is a body established under the
Multistate Tax Compact enacted by the Utah Legislature in 1969 as
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §59-22-1 through 59-22-8, (Supp. 1969).
The purposes of the act are set forth in Section 59-22-1, Art. I, and
are as follows:
"(1) Facilitate proper determination of state and local
tax liability of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable
apportionment of tax bases and settlement of apportionment
disputes,
(2) Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant
components of tax systems,
(3) Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in
the filing of tax returns and in other phases of tax administration and,
(4) Avoid duplicative taxation." (Emphasis added.)
Section 59-22-1, Art. IV, entitled "Division Of Income" is an exact duplicate of the U.D.I.T.P.A. as set forth in UTAH CODE
TATED §§59-13-78 through 97. The regulations proposed by the
Multistate Tax Commission relate to the U.D.I.T.P.A. provisions of
the M ultistate Tax Compact.
nsMuitistate Tax Commission's Proposed Regulation IV 2 (d).
1 P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 1T 6100 et seq.

aerospace products for the government, the growing of
tobacco p:rnducts and the distribution and production of
motion pictures, each division operating independently
with no strong central management. In setting forth general criteria, the regulations provide:
"In general, the activities of the taxpayer will be
considered a single business if there is evidence to
indicate that the divisions under consideration are
integrated with, dependent upon or contribute to
each other and the operations of the taxpayer as a
whole." 110
This is simply a restatement of the definition of a unitary
business.'"' The proposed regulations go on to point out
that the key factors are whether or not the groups are in
the same general line of business and whether or not the
group is involved in steps in a vertical process. The example given is surprisingly close to the instant case:
"A taxpayer is almost always engaged in a single
trade or business when its various divisions are
engaged in different steps in a large, vertically
structured enterprise. For example, a taxpayer
which explores for and mines copper ores; concentrates, smelts and refines the copper ores; and
fabricates the refined copper into consumer products is engaged in a single trade or business, regardless of the fact that the various steps in the
process are operated substantially independently
of each other with only general supervision from
the taxpayers's executive offices." 121
119/d.
120Tax Commission Regulation No. 8(3).
121 Multistate Tax Commission's Proposed Regulation IV 2 (d)
(2). I P-H STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 11 6100 et seq.
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Finally, the regulations list strong centralized management
as an important consideration. Any one of these factors,
the regulations provide, "creates a strong presumption
that the activities of the taxpayer constitute a single trade
or business." It seems quite clear that Kennecott falls
within the single business concept. In the first place, the
Tax Commission has held that Kennecott and its affiliates
constitute a unitary business. In the second place, it is
clear that all of the operations of Kennecott are the same
general type of business, that they are involved in steps in
a vertical process, and that there is, indeed, strong centralized management.
Utah is a member of the Multistate Tax Compact
which proposed these regulations. In view of the strong
legislative intent favoring uniformity, the clear need for
uniform regulations under the act and the fact that these
regulations are the product of some of the best minds in
the field, we submit that these regulations are extremely
persuasive in this matter.
Research has developed virtually no precedent for
the type of approach being attempted here by the Tax
Commission with respect to Utah Copper Division. The
classic argument is between separate accounting and the
formula. Rarely have tax administrators tried to gerrymander the taxable entity in the way attempted by the
Commission. The only case which we have found in point
is Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. American Telephone.
and Telegraph Company. 122 This case involved two distinct
122332 Pa. 509, 115 A. 2d 373 (1955).
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types of business operated by A. T. and T. The first was
their Long Lines Division and the second was a holding
company which they operated. The taxing authority
sought to divide the corporation into different divisions
and tax only the Long Lines Division, utilizing a three
part statutory formula. The taxpayer contended that
all of its operations should be considered, including
the property, payroll and sales of its holding company.
The consideration of the entire Company, as opposed to
the Long Lines Division, substantially reduced the allocation of income to Pennsylvania. The court stated the
issue as follows:
"The controversy hinges on the sole question
whether the corporate net income tax should be
applied against the company on a unitary or on a
multi-form basis by the latter being meant the recognition of its two distinct activities, the one its
operations in its longlines department, and the
other its operations as a holding company unrelated to any activities in Pennsylvania."
The court held that the act required utilization of the entire company for purposes of application of the formula,
and that the net result was neither inequitable nor unconstitutional. It, therefore, sustained the taxpayer's position. The instant case in much stronger than the A. T.
& T. case, inasmuch as we do not deal here with distinct
types of businesses, but with various portions of a unitary,
integrated business.
Moreover, the carving out of the Utah Copper Division is completely contrary to the entire development in
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the field of allocation law. From Butler Bros. to Western
Contracting, case law has consistently recognized that
separate accounting is not an appropriate method for determining the income of a unitary business. Likewise, one
authority has noted:
"The separate accounting method, as the name
implies, permits a firm to treat its business in a
state as if it were separate and distinct from the
business carried on outside the state. Proponents
of the method contend that it is more accurate
than the apportionment formula, but as a method
to be used in general by unitary business, it is
theoretically and practically unsound." 123 (Emphasis added.)

Western Contracting comes to the same conclusion:
"Subsection (6) of the above-quoted statute does
not purport to tax directly a corporation doing
business both within and without the state on the
net income which may be credited by a system of
accounting to business done within the state.
Rather, it seeks to tax percentage of the entire
net income wherever it may be earned, by a formula of apportionment composed of three distinct
ratios, and to attribute this portion to business
carried on within this state."124 (Emphasis added.)
The action is also inconsistent with the Tax Commission's own regulations which provide: 125
"The statutory formula method of allocating income will be required for the operations of the
123C. RATLIFF, INTERSTATE APPORTIONMENT OF BUSINESS J°NCOME
FOR STATE INCOME TAX PURPOSES, 24 (1962).
12418 Utah 2d 23 at 27.
125Corporate Franchise Tax Regulation No. 8(3).
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corporation which are unitary ... Thus, where the
operations of a business within Utah is dependent
upon or contributes to the operation of the business outside the state, the entire operation is unitary in character, and the portion of the unitary
business subject to tax in Utah shall be determined
by the apportionment formula."
(Emphasis
added.)
Another interesting aspect of the treatment given to
Utah Copper Division concerns the federal income tax
deduction. The Tax Commission, in carving out the Utah
Copper Division, treats it as if it were a hypothetical, independent entity. For 1967, the Tax Commission finds
that this hypothetical entity had taxable income, before
allocation, of over $27,000,000 and, yet, less than $1,000,000
is ascribed to this Division as a deduction for federal income tax paid. In 1968, the comparable figures are
$43,719,000 income for the "entity", and only $6.8 million
in income tax allowed.
Thus, if the Tax Commission's reasoning is analyzed,
we have a very profitable entity which managed to pay
the federal government a tax of only 3.7 % in 1967 and
15 % in 1968. This is clear evidence of the unreasonableness of the Commission's approach. It seeks to treat the
Utah Copper Division as an independent entity for purposes of determining its income exclusive of all other company operations, and, yet, when it comes to determining
deduction for federal income tax for this entity, the Commission determines it in connection with and as a part
of the overall operation, basing the allocation on un-
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sound accounting principles. If, in fact, the Utah Copper
Division were an entity, separate from the corporation,
as the Commission' approach presupposes, it would pay
federal income tax of 48 % like any other corporation.
In addition, the Utah Copper Division would have all
manner of additional expenses, not reflected in the Tax
Commission's figures, in order to pay for the wide variety
of products, services and other contributions made by
Kennecott sources outside the Utah Copper Division. The
Utah Copper Division, for example, would have to have
its own purchasing (instead of using New York), its own
research laboratory (instead of using Metal Mines Division or Ledgemont), its own internal counsel (now provided in New York), its own insurance group (now New
York) and a whole host of additional expensive items
to compensate for the contribution from other portions of
this unitary operation. As noted by Mr. Keesling:
"You take your Utah Division and say that is a
separate operating business is like saying that a
body can function without a head. I don't thir1k
it would function. I think you remove your New
York office, I think your division out here would
collapse. You need your central office for the management, the financing. You need the outside
states for your sales. The whole thing together,
it seems to me, is one big business and shoukl be
treated as such." 126
In short, the carving out of the Utah Copper Division
simply does not square with the realities of a unitary business. If, indeed, the division is to be treated as a single
12

"Tr. 238.
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entity, it is respectfully submitted that such entity should
be allowed an appropriate federal income tax deduction
( 48 %) and appropriate deductions for all other items
which it presently derives through other portions of the
Company's operation.
(4)

Improper Starting Point -

To find an income for this artificial entity, the auditing division has simply picked out a figure from the depletion schedules of Kennecott's returns. In short, the
starting point for the computation of income in the deficiency assessment is "net income from the property"
as extracted from Kennecott's depletion schedules (See
the deficiency assessment, exhibit "E", at pages 160-61).
There is absolutely nothing in the statutes of the State
of Utah which justifies this bizarre approach. The franchise tax is measured by net income; not by net income
from the property. The concepts are different, and the
result is absurd. This "starting point" error was condemned by both Dr. Randall and Mr. Keesling. The testimony of Dr. Randall on this subject was as follows:
"In the computation of income allocable to Utal1,
the Tax Commission has used as a starting point
the concept of net income from the property for
depletion purposes. By federal statute and by tax
commission Regulation 12 ( 1) this, in my opinion,
is a special concept for a special purpose and is
not the concept on which the ultimate tax should
be based, or on which an allocation of income for
purposes of taxing should be based. Utah statutes
and regulations, in my opinion, provide specifically
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a separate calculation of net income to which the
tax rate shall be applied. The Utah statute, Section 59-13-6 in defining net income to which the
tax rate applied, provides that it shall be gross
income less allowable deductions. This is a clifferent concept calculated under a different statutory
and regulatory provision than the concept of net
income from the property used in Regulation 12
for depletion purposes. Section 59-13-79 provides
for apportionment purposes under the Uniform
Act the net income as determined for the tax base
under Section 59-13-6 shall be used. In my opinion, the audit report has not followed this in the
deficiency determination." 121
Frank M. Keesling, perhaps the leading authority in the
field of allocation of multi-state income, likewise observed
the folly of the deficiency assessment in this resped:
"I feel strongly that there is no basis for deviating
from the statutory formula particularly to go over
to something that is little more than a separate
accounting approach and also, I think you get a
figure that is, start with a figure that is, far greater
than the actual income or actual taxable income of
the company, which is one of the vices of separate
accounting." 128 (Emphasis added.)
The state has given no justification for this obvious departure from statutory requirements and basic substantive
tax concepts.
Other discussions, both hereinabove, (POINT II) and
hereinafter, (POINT VI) point out in greater detail why
12

1Tr. 390.

128Tr. 259-60.
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the depletion figures are not synonymous with taxable income and why the separate accounting approach, in genernl, is invalid.

The Tax Commission's decision allocates an unreasonably large amount of income to the State of Utah.
(5)

In support of the taxpayer's contentions that the
deficiency assessment was inequitable and unreasonable,
it called as an expert witness, Dr. Clyde N. Randall,
the late Dean of the College of Business of the University
of Utah. (Dr. Randall's qualifications have been set forth
at length hereinabove.) In support of his opinion that
the deficiency assessment was wholly inequitable, Dr.
Randall made comparisons to certain other objective
standards. Using the year 1968 as a comparative year,
Dr. Randall observed that for the year 1968, the State of
Utah is claiming, through the Tax Commission, 30%
more income allocated to Utah than the entire corporrition
reported for federal income tax purposes. 129 Thus, while
Utah is claiming some $30 million for the year 1968, the
total taxable income, after payment of federal income
taxes for the entire corporation, was only $23 million for
the same period. This is unrebuttable evidence of how
unreasonable the Tax Commission's decision is. Herc we
have a corporation with mining operations in Nevada, New
:Mexico, Arizona, Utah and extensive administrative operations and selling operations in the State of New York,
not to mention various laboratories, research facilities,
129Tr.

395-96.
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computer groups and other service facilities located
the country. For some strange reason, Utah
is able to claim 30% more allocable income than the rntire
corporation produces from the standpoint of federal income tax returns.
Dr. Randall further observed that if depletion figures are to be used as a starting point, various adjustments would have to be made in order to bring them into
line with taxable net income. 130 Making these adjustments,
plus an appropriate adjustment for the selling factor
which, under the Uniform Act and under the Tax Commission's own approach, is allocated outside the State
of Utah, Dr. Randall arrived at a figure of $11 million
allocable to Utah for the year 1968; as compared io $30
million as calculated by the Tax Commission.
Through yet a third test, applying a different approach, Dr. Randall arrived at a $13 million figure as
compared with $30 million for the corporation as a whole
and, if viewed on a consolidated basis, at an $81h million
figure. 131
Based upon these objective methods of comparison,
Dr. Randall concluded that the state's method of allocating income was wholly inequitable and unreasonable.

13oTr.

392.

131Tr.

396.
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The Tax Commission's whole approach is inconsistent.
(6)

It bears noting that the entire Tax Commission approach is internally inconsistent. In the first place, the
Tax Commission has adopted various methods for allocating income for the different divisions and affiliates involved here. It has offered no justification for this inconsistency in its decision.
It would seem, at a rrmnmum, that a substitute
method of allocation adopted by the taxing agency should
bear some reasonable relationship to the alleged reasons
for departure from the formula. Thus, for example, the
Commission might find that the formula does not fairly
reflect business activities of a multi-state finance company
since it has no sales as such. A logical way to remedy
this problem would be by deleting the sales factor and,
perhaps, substituting another factor based upon location
of the company's loan customers. In the example, the
substitute method is relevant to and a proper remedy for
the basic problem with the statutory formula.

In the instant case, this is not true. As discussed
above (POINT II), the basic "justification" announced has
something to do with the sales factor - to paraphrase "since sales are located outside Utah, they may be reallocated to Utah." Content with this justification, the
Commission then proceeds to establish a substitute
method which has absolutely no relationship to the
claimed irregularities in the statutory formula. Curiously,
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although the Commission finds that the formula does not
properly reflect business activity in Utah, it goes on to
use the formula itself in the substitute method - all it
has done is to change the taxable entity to which the
formula is applied. Instead of a consolidated group, the
entity is transmutated into an unlikely group of separate
taxpayers including some corporations (Chase, Peabody,
Bear Creek) and some branches of corporations (Utah
Copper Division and Tintic) . We submit that this whole
approach is unreasonable and inequitable. The only possible justification which could exist for so completely carving up the taxable entity would be that it consisted of
truly separate and distinct businesses - a hypothesis completely rejected by the Commission's own finding of a
unitary relationship.
CONCLUSION AS TO COMMISSION'S
SUBSTITUTE METHODS OF APPORTIONMENT
It is respectfully submitted that the method of taxa-

tion adopted herein by the Tax Commission is a distorted
and grotesque effort by the Commission to extract far
more than its fair share of taxes from this taxpayer. Were
this court to place its stamp of approval on this exercise
in administrative capriciousness, the net result would be
that the Tax Commission would be unique in the field of
administrative bodies. It would be, in that event, an
autonomous agency answerable neither to the legislature
nor the judiciary, free to run rampant through all concepts
of equity and reasonableness. The Tax Commission's
method of taxation must be overruled.
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POINT V.
THE TAX COMMISSION HAS ERRED IN
ITS METHOD OF ALLOCATING DEDUCTIBLE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TO THE
UTAH AFFILIATED GROUP.
The Taxpayer Has Used Sound Accounting Principles in Taking the Allowable Federal Income Tax Deduction in Determining its Taxable Income.
A.

In rendering its decision, the Tax Commission has
denied the taxpayer its statutory right132 to deduct from
gross income the proportionate share of federal income
tax paid by Kennecott and its affiliated corporations ""hich
filed a consolidated federal return. All of the federal income taxes paid by Kennecott and all of its affiliates
which filed a federal return could not be claimed by the
Utah Consolidated Group, of course, because many of the
subsidiary corporations filing the federal consolidated return were not doing business in Utah, and thus were not
included in the Utah consolidated return group. For
this reason, the taxpayer was required to allocate the
Utah consolidated group's proportionate share of deductible federal income taxes. The taxpayer made this
allocation by applying sound accounting principles employed and recommended by various governmental agen132UTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-7 (1953) states: "In computing net
income there shall be allowed as deductions . . . (3) Taxes paid or
accrued within the taxable year, except-" (Exception not applicable.)
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cies 133 and independent accounting authorities. 134
This accounting procedure takes into account the
fact that if a corporation in the consolidated group
incurred a loss during the tax year, or had tax credits in excess of tax liability, it contributed to the
net profitability of the consolidated group in that such
losses or tax credits reduced the consolidated group's tax
liability. Governmental agencies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission which require factual reporting of profits and losses of each individual corporation in
the consolidated group require accounting methods which
reflect these tax savings. This is done by allocating back
to the loss corporation a negative income tax which decreases that corporation's net loss. This negative income
tax is offset by requiring the profit corporations in the
consolidated group to enter in their books the tax expenditure they would have incurred had they not filed
a consolidated return with the loss corporations. As with
the Kennecott consolidated group, funds are actually
transferred between the affiliated corporations on the
basis of the allocation. 135 The subsidiary corporations of
Kennecott which are making a profit during the year pay
to the parent corporation the amount required to meet
133See, e.g., Rule 45(b) (6) of the General Rules and Regulations
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, adopted by
the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C. F. R. 250.45
(b) (6); and Internal Revenue Regulations §l.1502-33(d) (2).
134See, ACCOUNTING FOR INCOM TAXES, a pamphlet published by
Arthur Anderson & Co., May 1960, Chapter VII, Tax Allocation Between Companies.
1

ssTr. 328.
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the subsidiaries' federal tax obligations as if it were filing
separately. At the end of the year when the consolidated
group's tax liability is determined, the difference between
the amounts required and the amounts contributed are
allocated as described above, and an actual cash transfer
is made to the loss corporations.
The Supreme Court of Kansas has recently upheld
this method of allocating federal income tax to the various
subsidiary corporations for state income tax purposes after
the subsidiaries had joined with their parent corporation
in filing a consolidated federal income tax return. Cities
Service Gas Company vs. James T. McDonald, Director
of Revenue. 136 The subsidiary in question had earned a
profit during the year, but the consolidated group had a
net operating loss and thus paid no federal income tax.
The subsidiary had paid to its parent corporation an
amount equal to its tax liability on a separate return basis
as do the Kennecott subsidiaries. These funds were distributed to the loss corporations in the affiliated group at
the end of the taxable year. As stated by the court:
"There was undisputed testimony . . . that
the method of accounting employed by the companies in allocating federal tax liability on a consolidated return basis had been recognized by the
Internal Revenue Service for many years. This
particular method contemplates compensatory payments to loss subsidiaries for the benefits derived
from the use of their operating losses in the consolidated return and is an accepted accounting
prncedure."
136204 Kan. 705, 466 P. 2d 277 (1970).
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The above described method of allocating federal income taxes between affiliated corporations has been ascribed to by the Technical Service Division of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 131 as well as
being considered by one of the nation's most respected
C. P.A. firms 133 to be probably the only realistic allocation
method available:
"The consolidated income tax ordinarily should
be so allocated that each subsidiary is charged
with the amount of tax it would have paid based
upon a separate-return computed as if such subsidiary had always filed its tax returns on a separate return basis ...
"The tax benefit applicable to any loss subsidiary included in the consolidated return should
be immediately paid or credited by the parent to
the subsidiary and taken into the income of the
subsidiary." 139
The result achieved by this method of accounting is
that necessary to accurately reflect net income allocable
to the Utah Consolidated Group from the Federal Consolidated group:
"The income-tax accounting for the subsidiaries on an individual-company basis follows the
principle of assigning the taxes to the source of
income which gave rise thereto. Stated another
137See THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, 74, July, 1970.
13BSee ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME TAXES, supra, Note 134.
139 [

d. at 68.
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way, it results in a proper matching of costs and
resources. 110 "

B. Regulation 13 has no application in allocating
federal income taxes from the federal affiliated group to
the Utah affiliated group.
The Tax Commission, by its Conclusion of Law No.
14, has denied the taxpayer the right to employ sound
accounting principles in allocating deductible federal taxes
from the federal consolidated group to the Utah consolidated group. The Commission's basis for this demal is
its own Regulation 13. This action by the Tax Commission is without basis or merit.
Regulation 13, when interpreted in a way most favorable to its drafters, has no application to the fact situation at hand. Subsection 4 (a) of the regulation defines
the scope of the regulation with respect to allocation of
deductible federal income taxes, It states:
"4. Allocation of Federal Income Taxes.
" (a) An assignment of a portion of the total
allowable federal income tax deduction on the Utah
corporation franchise return may be required for
certain purposes, such as arriving at:
"(1)

"(2)
Ho[d., at 69.

Income less 'related expense' which is
subject to specific allocation under the
statute,
Net income from various properties in
depletion computations, and
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"(3)

separat e

.
accountmg
determinations of
net income when authorized by the
Utah State Tax Commission." (Emphasis added.)

Note that this subsection limits the application of the remainder of the provisions in subsection 4 to situations
where a "portion" of the "total allowable" deduction is
required to be segregated, not where the "total allo\Vable"
deduction is broken out from some other figure such as,
in this instance, the federal consolidated group's tax payment.
This interpretation is borne out by the examples in
subsection 4 (a), and subsequent language such as the
incremental designations of "profit producing item or division." The first example under subsection 4(a) relates
to items of income such as those set forth in §59-13-81,
UTAH ConE ANN. (1953) which are allocated to situs, etc.
and not subject to the three-part allocation formula, thus
a part of the total federal tax deduction allowable must be
allocated to that item rather than be apportioned under the
three-part formula. Similarly, under example 2, extraction of minerals will usually only be a part of a business
engaged in mining and processing and even if it did business solely in Utah, it would have to allocate only a portion of allowable federal tax deduction for the purpose of
determining its depletion alowance. In these mntexts, the
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words "producing item or division141 " as used in subsection 4 have meaning and substance, but these words
lose their contextual meaning if forced into the interpretation of the Tax Commission with respect to the issue
at hand.
In his testimony, Dr. Randall readily distinguished
the different levels of allocation and apportionment of
federal taxes and where Regulation 13 did and did not
apply. 112 He testified there are three levels at which federal income taxes are allocated. 143 Dr. Randall further
testified that at the point where there is an allocation of
federal taxes between the Federal Consolidated Group,
Regulation 13 does not apply. 144 He recognized that the
regulation, as it reads, can apply only where "portion" of
the total deduction of federal income taxes are required
1•1See, e.g., the last sentence of subsection 4(c) of Regulation 13
which' states: "Federal income tax assignments are to be made to
profit-producing items or divisions only. Each profit-producing item
or division must be assigned its proportionate share of the total allowable federal tax deduction based on the ratio that the income of
such profit-producing item or division bears to the total of all profitproducing items or divisions. Regardless of the mechanics used, the
total of the federal tax assignments made against the profit-producing
items or divisions, regardless of where located or whether or not subject to state income or franchise taxes, may not exceed the total corporate federal tax liability for the particular year involved (in case
of an accrual basis taxpayer), or the total amount paid (in the case
of a cash basis taxpayer)." (Emphasis added.)
1•2See Tr. 324-32
143Tr. 324.
H•Tr. 325.
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to be broken out. 145 This is a logical and sensible distinction in light of the fact that while there are valid reasons
to make compensatory payments between subsidiaries,
there would be no need to do so between "items and divisions" of a single corporation.

C. The Tax Commission AUocates an Unreasonably
Small Federal Income Tax Deduction to the Utah Copper Division.
While discussing federal income tax allocation, it bears
brief repetition to note (See POINT IV, supra) that by
using the "carved out" Utah Copper Division, the Tax
Commission has allowed a deduction of federal income to
only 3. 7% of net income for 1967 and 15% for 1968. It is
clear that this is unreasonably small considering the federal rates of 48% for those years.
D. The Tax Commission has no Authority to Promulgate Regulation 13.
The Tax Commission, by its decision, has denied the
taxpayer the right to allocate federal income taxes between members of the federal consolidated group based
upon a regulation which is beyond the scope and power
of the Tax Commission to promulgate and is, therefore
invalid, having no force or effect. Neither the Utah Constitution nor legislative enactment give the Tax Commission authority to promulgate Regulation 13. Nor is there
H5Tr. 329, Dr. Randall states: "And also in the Regulation of the
Tax Commission, the word is used "divisions" only. At least
my
thinking, this is an allocation within those areas that are applicable
to Utah."
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any constitutional or statutory authority which requires
the taxpayer to be bound by such a regulation. Article
XIII, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, as amended
(1959), creates the State Tax Commission. It gives the
Commission power to "administer and supervise the tax
laws of the state." It is clear that this language does not
give the Tax Commission the power of general regulation
in that section 11 provides one specific instance when the
Commission can promulgate regulations, and then only by
authority of the legislature. 146 This provision does not give
140 Article XIII, Section 11 states:
"Sec. 11. Creation of State Tax Commission - Membership Governor to appoint - Terms - Duties County boards - Duties.
"There shall be a State Tax Commission consisting of four members, not more than two of whom shall belong to the same political
party. The members of the Commission shall be appointed by the
Governor, by and with the consent of the Senate, for such terms of
office as may be provided by law. The State Tax Commission shall
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State. It shall assess
mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize the valuation and
assessment of property among the several counties. It shall have such
other powers of original assessment as the Legislature may provide.
Under such regulations in such cases and within such limitations as
the Legislature may prescribe, it shall review proposed bond issues,
revise the tax levies of local governmental units, and equalize the
assessment and valuation of property within the counties. The duties
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization by the Constitution
and Laws of this State shall be performed by the State Tax Commission.
"In each county of this State there shall be a County Board of
Equalization consisting of the Board of County Commissioners of said
county. The County Boards of Equalization shall adjust and equalize
the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property within
their respective counties, subject to such regulation and control by
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed by law. The State
Tax Commission and the County Boards of Equalization shall each
have such other powers as may be prescribed by the Legislature. (As
amended November, 1912; November 3, 1930; November 4, 1958,
effective January 1, 1959) ." (Emphasis added.)
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the Tax Commission authority to promulgate Regulation
13. The only other powers the Tax Commission has in
this respect, under Section 11 of Article XIII, are those
"as may be prescribed by the legislature." The legislalature has not given the Tax Commission broad rule making powers, rather it has given such authority sparingly,
even differentiating between subsections of a particular
code provision. For example, section 59-13-7 entitled "Deductions from gross income", of which subsection (3) is
the focal point of this discussion, has several subsections
which direct the Tax Commission to prescribe regulations.
For example, subsection 10, dealing with the deduction
of future expense liabilities as a result of a casual sale of
real property, is subject to Tax Commission regulation.
Similarly, the legislature directed that rules and regulations be prescribed under subsection 8 dealing with depletion. There is no legislative mandate however, to prescribe
regulations under subsection 3 which allows a deduction
for federal taxes. Therefore, Regulation 13 which deals only
with the deductability and allocation of federal income
taxes is without constitutional or legislative authority.
One of the most recognized maxims of statutory construction is that of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
This canon of construction can have no greater application than in the case at hand. By specifically directing
the Tax Commission to promulgate regulations with re1

"

147See e.g., Utah Rapid Transit Co. u. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546,
58 P. 2d 1 (1936) wherein the court states: "The familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius is especially applicable in the
construction of a statute."

118

spect to some of the subsections of
the legislature has effectively prohibited the Tax Commission from
enacting regulations with respect to those subsections as
to which the legislature has made no such direction.
It follows that the Tax Commission exceeded its
authority in promulgating Regulation 13, and that that
regulation can be given no force or effect as to the method
by which Kennecott allocates federal taxes of the federal
consolidated group back to the affiliate corporations for
the purpose of determining the allowable federal tax deduction.

In the Cities Service Gas case, the court made
a distinction between the facts in that case and the Louisiana case of Trunkline Gas Company v. Collector of
Revenue, 182 S. 2d 674 (La. App. 1965). This case was
distinguished on the basis that the Collector of Revenue
of Louisiana had specific statutory authority to make
rules and regulations which governed the allocation of deductible federal income taxes and had promulgated such
regulations, but there was no statutory authority for such
regulations in Kansas and none had been issued. Similarly, in the case at hand, there is no statutory authority
for a regulation on this subject nor a valid regulation applicable to the subject matter. For this reason, sound
accounting principles should apply as was the case in
Cities Service.
The Tax Commission has attempted to infuse validity
into Regulation 13 by attaching it to the coat tails of the
consolidated return regulation (Regulation 4) which was
promulgated under the direction of specific legislative
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authority. 143 Conclusion of Law No. 14 of the Tax Commission's decision states:
"Kennecott has accepted and is bound by the
Commission regulations governing the filing of consolidated returns, including Regulation 4 and 13
and, therefore, the action of Kennecott in claiming
to
a deduction for federal income taxes
Treasury Regulation 1.1502-33 (d) (2) is improper."
The taxpayer is more than willing that it be bound
by the consolidation regulations validly issued by the
Tax Commission. However, Regulation 13 is neither a
consolidation regulation nor a validly issued regulation.
Regulation 4 is the only regulation which is identified by
the Tax Commission as being prescribed under §59-13-23.
subsection 1 of Regulation 4 makes it clear that it is the
only regulation the taxpayer must consent to in order to
attain the privilege of filing a consolidated return:
"Section 59-13-23 gives an affiliated group the
privilege of making a consolidated return for any
taxable year in lieu of separate returns. The privilege of filing a consolidated return is given upon
the condition that all corporations which are properly includable in a consolidated return consent to
this regulation; ... " (Emphasis added.)
By its own words, the Tax Commission has excluded
the requirement that other regulations be followed in
quid pro quo for the privilege of filing a consolidated return. It is now trying to exorcise its own regulatory Ian-_
guage for the purpose of giving validity to an otherwise
invalid and unenforceable regulation.
14BUTAH CoDE ANN.

§ 59-13-23(2) (1953).
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CONCLUSION AS TO FEDERAL TAX ALLOCATION
The Tax Commission, by its Conclusion 14, has denied the taxpayer the right to deduct from its gross income all of the taxes paid within the taxable year as provided by UTAH CoDE ANN. §59-13-7 (3), (Supp. 1969). This
denial is based upon a regulation (Regulation 13), which
the Tax Commission had no authority to promulgate. For
this reason, the regulation is void of force or effect in determining deductible federal income taxes from the taxpayer's gross income. Even assuming arguendo that the
regulation has validity, its provisions are not applicable
to allocating federal income taxes from the Federal Consolidated Group to the Utah Consolidated Group. For
these reasons, the court should sustain the taxpayer's use
of sound accounting principles in determining the allowable federal income tax deduction.
POINT VI.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THE DEPLETION DEDUCTION.
At the outset, we deem it appropriate to point out
to the court the importance of a clear-cut resolution of
the allowable depletion deduction for the Bingham mine.
This matter has been at issue between the parties since
1942. On two prior occasions, this court has considered the
question and remanded it to the Commission for resolution. The Commission's decision below adds a new twist
to the depletion question which adds further to the confusion which has existed on this subject in the past.
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Elsewhere in this brief, we have already discussed
many principles which have application to the depletion
issue. It has been pointed out, for example, that the Uniform Act was not intended by either its drafters or by
the legislature as a means through which the substantive
tax law of the state should be altered. 149 We have also
noted that the concept of "net income from the property"
as used in the depletion calculation, and that of allocated
income, as used for a tax base, are entirely different concepts with entirely different purposes. 150 In the same vein,
we have cited numerous authorities for the proposition
that separate accounting would not impeach the three
part statutory formula as applied to a unitary business.
All of these factors bear upon the proper consideration of
the depletion issue.
As a final matter of background, it should be noted
that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discuss
the depletion question in the abstract as if it were a separate and distinct problem unrelated to those set forth and
discussed above. In truth, the concept of depletion is inextricably intertwined with the transcendent matters of
consolidation (See POINT 1) and allocation (See POINTS II,
III and IV). It is virtually impossible to draw meaningful comparisons between the taxpayer's depletion computations, involving as they do the entire Utah Consolidated
group, and the Commission's method, which deals only
H9Pierce, The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax Pur·
poses, 35 TAXES 747 (1953). "The act presupposes that the state
has already defined the tax base."
ioop1ease refer back to POINT II supra pp. 68-76, and POINT IV
supra pp. 102-04.
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with the "carved out" Utah Copper Division. Nonetheless, we will attempt hereinafter to analyze the question
through the common denominator of reasonableness
through applicable concepts and principles which should
apply regardless of other variables.
A.

The Commission's Decision Violates the Depletion Statute in that its Net Effect is to Reduce
the Statutory Depletion Deduction from 33-1/3%,
as Provided by Law to 22%.

The Utah statute allowing the depletion deduction
is UTAH CoDE ANNOTATED, Section 59-13-7 (9). Subsection
(b) therein is the statutory method the taxpayer has
elected to use in computing depletion. It provides:
"The allowance for depletion shall be 33-1/3 % of
the net income from the property during the taxable year without allowance for depletion."
This language is virtually identical to the federal provision
for depletion in Section 611 of the Internal Revenue
Code.1s1
The Commission's regulations define the concept of
net income from the property as follows:
"In general, gross income from the property is the
amount of the proceeds of the crude mineral product or concentrate, if sold, or the market or field
price of such crude mineral products or concentrates if further processed prior to sale. Net income
1s1Section 611 (26 U. S. C. A. §611) provides: "Such allowance
shall not exceed 503 of the taxpayer's taxable income from the property computed without allowance for depletion."
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from the
must be computed by deducting
from gross mcome from the property all deductions
allowed by statute in computing taxable net income (excluding the allowance for depletion) to
the extent that they are applicable to the property." (Emphasis added.) 152
Whatever else may seem vague or ambiguous in connection with the depletion function, one thing stands out
with pristine clarity - the Tax Commission in its decision
has violated the depletion statute by reducing depletion
below that allowed. This may be clearly seen by reference
to Exhibit "P" attached to the Commission's decision.
For the year 1967, the Commission finds taxable income
from the property of $32,665,490.00 after deduction of
federal income tax. On this amount, it has allowed a depletion deduction of only $7,204,602. As opposed to the
33-1/3 % expressly allowed by statute, the Tax Commission has allowed only 22.05% as a depletion deduction.
The picture is much the same for the year 1968. Using
a net income from the property figure of $52,003,658.00,
the Commission has allowed a deduction of only $11,364,896.00 for depletion, or some 21.86%.
In view of the plain language of the statute which
allows 33-1/3% and the equally plain effect of the decision which grants but 22%, it is obvious that the Commission should be charged with the duty of explaining
and justifying its attempt, through administrative fiat,
to reduce a statutorily granted deduction. The "justification" for this obvious departure as set forth by the ComCorporation Franchise Tax Reg. No. 12, Exhibit "C".
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mission is, we submit, wholly without merit. The basic
conclusions of the Commission on this matter are set
forth in Conclusions of Law Nos. 17 through 22, which
we quote as follows:
"17. That the formula proposed by the Commission's Auditing Division to determine the depletion
allowance to which Kennecott is entitled is inapplicable to the present case because income from
the property is known and is set forth on Kennecott's returns.
18. The taxable income from the property, as
contained in Kennecott's returns, is subject to
further adjustment before the computation of the
depletion allowance and, therefore, Kennecott is
not entitled to a deduction of one-third of such
amount.
19. Kennecott is entitled to the statutory depletion allowance on net income from the property.
As the Auditing Division has determined that the
net income from the Utah mining operations of
Kennecott is equivalent to what has been denominated taxable income from the property by Kennecott on its returns, we conclude that such taxable
income from the property includes post mining income and that in order to compute the depletion
allowance to which Kennecott is entitled, post
mining income should be excluded.
20. A reasonable method for determining the
amount of post mining income to be excluded from
Kennecott's reported income from Utah property,
is to subject said taxable income from the property
to the formula established by the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act.
21. The utilization of the three factor formula for
the purpose of determining the amount of income
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related to post mining activities, has been utilized
by the Commission in the cases of Utah Copper
Company v. State Tax Commission, supra, and
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Commission, supra.
22. That the Commission has made a supplemental computation of depletion, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "P" and by reference
made a part hereof, which supplemental computation should be incorporated into the aforesaid audit
deficiencies by way of an amendment therto."
We will analyze the Commission's premises separately:
The assumption that net income from the property is synonymous with taxable net income.
(1)

The starting point for the Commission's line of reasoning on depletion is set forth in the second sentence of
Conclusion of Law No. 19 to the effect that net income
from the property (a depletion computation) is "equivalent to" taxable net income. As we have attempted to
point out at some length hereinabove, this assumption is
simply not correct. There is no necessary relationship
whatsoever between the depletable base (which is net
income from the property) and allocated net income for
tax purposes (which we will refer to as taxable income).
Please recall, for example, the hypothetical example given
in POINT IV above, with respect to the company which
operated retail clothing stores and a uranium mine, wherein we pointed out that the two figures might be widely
disparate. The regulations themselves, as promulgated
by the Tax Commission and thereafter conveniently for-
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gotten, make this distinction abundantly clear. To assume
equality between the depletable base and taxable income
one must assume that the same computations are neces-'
sary to arrive at each figure. Regulation 12 makes it entirely clear that this is not the case, for it says that:
"Net income from the property must be computed
by deducting from gross income from the property
all deductions allowed by statute in computing
taxable net income (excluding any allowance for
depletion) to the extent that they are applicable
to the property." (Emphasis added.)

In other words, if a deduction is not applicable to the

property, it is not subtracted as a deduction in the depletion computation. "Whereas, whether or not it is "applicable to the property" it must be deducted in arriving
at the taxable net income. We need not rely upon hypotheticals to demonstrate that this distinction is clearly
applicable in the case of Kennecott. Taxpayer produced
evidence at the hearing which clearly illustrates numerous
examples of expenditures which should clearly be allowed
as deduction in computing taxable net income but which
are not "applicable to the property" and hence, not deductible in arriving at the depletable base for the Bingham
mme:
- The Exploration Services Group is located in Salt
Lake City and in 1968 had a payroll of $1.3 million in Utah
and a property factor of almost $1 million (which consists
of rental which would be directly deductible as an expense
and capital invested which would be deductible to the
extent of allowable depreciation). This group does abso-
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lutely no work for the Utah mine, and, hence, these deductible items are not "applicable to the property" and
are not considered in the depletion computations, although
they are clearly allowable deductions in arriving at taxable income in Utah. 153
- The Kennecott Research Center on the University
campus, in the year 1968 performed approximately twothirds of its services for Kennecott operations other than
the Utah mine, and one-third for the Utah mine. The
center reported property of $2 million and payroll of $2.3
million for this same year. To the extent that the activities are not performed for the Utah mine, they are not
"applicable to the property" and are not subtracted in
Utah depletion computation. Nonetheless, they are proper
deductions in arriving at taxable income in Utah. 154
We could go on to cite numerous other examples set
forth in the record,1 55 but the foregoing should illustrate
the point adequately - the depletable base and taxable
income are simply disparate and incomparable concepts.
In addition to these facts, which speak clearly on this
point, we produced the expert opinion of Dr. Clyde Randall
to the same effect. 156
We can find no legal precedent directly in point on
this issue but do submit that both Superior Oil,1 51 and

'

l53Tr. 226.

15•See Tr. 221, 223, 227.
155see e.g., Tr. 224-28.
i5eTr. 390.

15134 Cal. Rptr. 545, 386 P. 2d 33 (1963).
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Honolulu Oil 1 ' 8 are sufficiently analogous to be of persuasive value here (particularly since the court has relied
on each of those cases with approval in Western Contracting''"'). Since the facts in Honolulu and Superior are virtually identical, we will discuss only the latter. Like
Kennecott, Superior Oil was engaged in the business of
extracting minerals from the earth. In the year in question, Superior, through a separate accounting method, had
a net income from production and sale of oil in California
of over $10 million. (This would have been approximately
its depletable base.) Under the three part formula, Superior had income allocated to California from its oil production and sale of some $750,000.00 and from all business
activities, a total of something over $1.1 million. Thus, in
Superior, the depletable base was almost ten (10) times
the allocated taxable income. Even though the depletion
issue was not discussed, as such, the case does stand as
highly respectable authority for the basic proposition that
the depletable base is not equal to allocated net taxable
income.
Other precedent is contained in the Commission's
own deficiency assessment which, for Peabody Coal reflects a depletable base of over $6.2 million (schedule 8-a)
and an apportionable loss of some $210,000.00 (schedule
8). The Commission's own figures thus demonstrate the
disparity between the two concepts.
1:;s34 Cal. Rptr. 552, 386 P. 2d 40 (1963).
15918 Utah 2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
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The Tax Commission has produced not one scintilla
of evidence and not one applicable authority to the contrary. This premise, essential to the Commission's entire
reasoning on depletion, cannot stand.

The Assumption that Income from the Property Includes Post Mining Income.
(2)

Based upon the first assumption, the Tax Commission then proceeds to make the second assumption that
"income from the property includes post mining income."
This premise, also essential to the Commission's reduction
of depletion, also finds itself without support in the record.
First, the premise on which it is based (net income =
depletable base) is, as we here noted above, entirely without merit.
Second, the record itself refutes this second assumption. Our own returns demonstrate that in 1967 for the
Bingham mine Kennecott deducted post mining items of
over $40 million including $3 million of post mining profit.
In 1968, for that mine we deducted $48 million in post
mining items including almost $5.8 million in post mining
profit. ' 60 Thus, although taxpayer has deducted literally
millions of dollars in post mining profits, the Tax Commission blithely concludes that we have not done so and
proceeds to re-deduct yet additional millions to arrive at
its figures for depletion.
150See Exhibit "A" at Tr. 466 and Exhibit "B" at Tr. 525.
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It is necessary to use a chart to reflect the wholly
arbitrary nature of what the Commission has done. Using
1967 for comparative purposes, we find: 161
(1)

Taxpayer
Net income from property before
subtraction of post mining profits* ...... $36,441,832

Commission

(2)

Subtraction of post mining profits ........-3,061.389

-3,061,389

(3)

Net income from property -------------------- 33,380,443

33,380,443

(4)

Second deduction of post mining profits

(5)

Depletable base -·-·---------··········-----····-------33,380,443

21,613,807

(6)

Depletion deduction (331/a%) ·····-·-·-------11,126,814

7,204,602

(7)

3 part allocation percentage --------------·-·-··

(8)

Allocated Income ····-------------·------------------- ····---------·----

n/a

X%

$36,441,832

-11,051,683

Y%

The chart clearly illustrates the problem. Both the
taxpayer and the Commission use the same figure in Step
1 which is net income from the property before subtraction of post mining profits. Both the taxpayer and the
Commission subtract (Step 2) post mining profits of over
$3 million. Both parties arrive at net income from the
property in identical figures as shown in Step 3. Then the
Tax Commission extracts a second deduction of post mining profits of over 11 million. This it has done by applying the three part statutory formula (approximately 66%)
to the net income from the property figure. The resulting
difference in the depletable base (at Line 5) is apparent.
161Figures are from Exhibit "A" at Tr. 466 and Exhibit "P" at
Tr. 691.
*These figures are before the deduction for federal income tax as
to which there is also a dispute as set forth in the preceding point.
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The difference in result is clearly indicated in Line 6
where the depletion deduction taken by the taxpayer
is over $11 million and that allowed by the Commission
is only $7 million. Each party thereafter proceeds to
apply the percentage derived from the three part statutory formula. In this case, it has been necessary to use
hypothetical figures rather than real ones because the
percentages are different, and the base to which the percentages apply different. (The taxpayer having applied
the formula to its overall consolidated net income and the
Tax Commission having applied the formula only to the
"carved out" Utah Copper Division.)
In short, although the Commission has deducted a
figure in Line 2 of over $3 million in post mining profits,
and therefore, the Commission must concede that this
figure has some validity, it proceeds then to make a second
deduction of over $11 million with no explanation. It is
this action of which we complain in this Point.

Notwithstanding this massive alteration in the taxpayer's figures which we submit is in patent violation of
the statute, the Commission produced not one iota of evidence at the time of the hearing to justify this additional
deduction of some $11 million for the year 1967 and almost
$18 million for the year 1968. If our figure of $3 million
plus is incorrect, we presume it would have been incumbent upon the Commission to present evidence directed
at that issue to point out why it was incorrect. Moreover,
if that figure is incorrect, we question why the Commission
itself has utilized that figure in its deduction, to its sub-

stantial benefit. Our method of computation of some $3
million plus was utilized in the federal income tax returns
filed by the company for depletion calculations for the
Utah mine. The figure has been accepted by the Internal
Revenue Service. How then, can the Utah State Tax Commission without so much as one ounce of supporting evidence, proceed to deduct yet another $11 million for the
very same item?
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the Commission's finding to the effect that our figure for net iucome
from the property includes post mining income is completely refuted by the record and that, moreover, the Commission has produced no evidence whatsoever to justify
its additional extraction of over $11 million for the very
same item.

The Use of the Three Factor Pormula to Reduce Depletion.
(3)

After making the assumptions previously discussed,
the Tax Commission goes on to find that a proper method
for determining the amount of post mining income is "to
subject the taxable income of the property to the formula
established by the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act". (Conclusion of Law, No. 20.)
We assume that, in large part, this finding was premised upon a complete misinterpretation of the prior Utah
decisions on this matter which we shall discuss in subparagraph ( 4) . We wish to point out here that there
is simply nothing reasonable whatsoever about subjecting
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the depletion figure to the three part formula. In the
first place, as we have argued at some lengths above,
the Uniform Act has a rather limited purpose - to
allocate income between states. It was not designed by
its drafters nor intended by its enactors to constitute a
portion of the substantive tax law of the State of Utah
which could be applied at the whim and caprice of the
Tax Commission. The fundamental error is that the Tax
Commission has forgotten that the depletion deduction
is, as a matter of course, subjected to the three part formula in allocating income to the State of Utah. What the
Commision has done, as clearly evidenced by the foregoing chart, and by the Commission's own Exhibit "P'',
is to run the depletion figures through the allocation
formula not once but twice. It will be noted that the Utah
fraction is used once in the depletion computation to reduce the depletion base by some $11 million in 1967 and
some $18 million 1968. It is also used a second time in the
tax computation to further reduce the depletion deduction.
We have researched the legislative history of the adoption
of the Uniform Act in the State of Utah. We have carefully read the comments of the drafters of the Code and
the official comments to the Act itself. We have not found
one indication that anybody ever intended that the fomula
of the Uniform Act would be so applied. In point of fact,
this double deduction engaged in by the Commission is
completely inconsistent with its own Finding of Fact No.
53 which states:
"Net income is determined in this manner regardless of how it is to be allocated under said act and
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Utah law requires that the amount of depletion
deduction be determined prior to allocation or apportionment of income not otherwise subject to
specific allocation under said uniform act." (Emphasis added.)
We believe that this Finding of Fact is essentially a correct statement of the method of computation of depletion.
And yet, the Commission itself has violated its own finding by applying the uniform act in determining the depletion deduction. If it is true, as Professor Pierce indicated, that the act presupposes that the state has already
defined the base of the tax, how then can the act be utilized in determining the base of the tax?
We end this point of argument by pointing out that
contrary to the Commission's conclusion, it is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and beyond any conception of legislative intent or imagination to utilize the three
factor formula from the Uniform Act in determining the
depletion deduction and then subjecting that deduction,
for a second time, to the very same percentage derived
from the very same formula.
( 4)

The prior Utah decisions.

In Conclusion of Law No. 21, the Commission attempts to justify its use of the Uniform Act and the three
factor formula in reducing depletion by relying upon the
prior Kennecott decisions issued by this court. 162 The
1a2Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 118 Utah
V. State

140, 221 P. 2d 857 (1950); Kennecott Copper Corporation
Tax Commission, 5 Utah 2d 306, 301 P. 2d 562 (1956).
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first of these dealt primarily with the year 1942 and
will be referred to as the "1942 case". The second
dealt with the years 1942 through 1950 and will be referred
to as the "1950 case".
It is no doubt conceded by the Tax Commision that
neither case is actually binding upon the parties under
such concepts as res judicata or collateral estoppel. Moreover, there are numerous underlying changes in fact and
law since 1950 which render the cases largely anachronistic
and inapplicable even under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Among these are:
(a) In neither case did Kennecott file its returns
on either a consolidated or corporate apportionment basis
- in both cases, Kennecott filed on a branch basis which
at that time was appropriate in view of the relative autonomy of the Utah Copper Division which until 1935 had
been a separate corporation.
(b) It was perhaps true in 1950, unlike today, that
the Utah operations were concerned only with mining.
Now, as the record here will demonstrate, Kennecott does
many things in Utah other than mining, including smelting (the ASARCO Smelter was purchased in 1959), refining (the Utah Refinery was built in 1961), research, exploration, engineering, computer operations, etc., all of
which are relatively recent and all of which provide services for various divisions or subsidiaries outside the State
of Utah.
(c) There has been substantial vertical and horizontal integration in the Company since 1950. In neither of

''1"
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the prior cases was there a finding of an overall unitary
business such as we have here from the Tax Commission.
(d) There has been a continual development in
Utah, and elsewhere, of the unitary concept and three part
formulary apportionment. The highlights in Utah being
the Western Contracting case in 1966 and the adoption
of the Uniform Act in 1967. Indeed, the Commission's
regulations which required separate accounting for mining
and construction companies were emasculated by Western
Contracting and withdrawn thereafter by the Commission itself. 163
For these and other reasons, we respectfully submit
that the very basic concepts and principles which should
guide the decision on depletion are far different today
than they were two decades ago.

The 1942 case.
The case involving the taxable year 1942, decided
in 1950, contained a number of issues, one of which was the
question of how to compute percentage depletion. One
part of this question was whether federal taxes should be
deducted in determining the depletion base and Kennecott
has since that date complied with this decision. The court
then proceeded to consider the calculation of the 33-1/3%
depletion allowance. A most significant fact is that in the
1942 case, Kennecott was claiming that it should attribute
1631967 UTAH L. REV. 438.
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no net income to post mining operations. Quoting the
court:
"Kennecott claims ... that no net income is attributable to these post mining operations."164
As we have discussed above, in the instant case, Kennecott has attributed several million dollars to post mining
income in the current returns. This alone completely distinguishes the case. Bearing this significant point in mind,
we quote from the court further:
"We need not place our approval on the formula
used by the Commission or arbitrarily determine
the break-through point between mining operations
and post mining activities. All we need do in this
case is to point out that there are two possible
paths for the taxpayer to take. The Commission
might agree that it take either but it cannot traverse both. Either the net income is from the property and should be allocated to this state, or the
net income is from the property and the post mining activities and they are not so related that the
net income cannot be roughly allocated to both
sources. The lengths to which the taxpayer might
go under its theory is aptly illustrated by the figures used in its first return. From an approximate
net income before depletion, in this state of $18,000,000, Kennecott seeks to establish a depletion
allowance of $13,000,000. This is far in excess of
the 33-1/3% provided for by statute.
In disposing of this last contention, we hold that
if Kennecott files its returns on an allocated basis
that it must allocate some of its net income to post
mining operations before computing depletion.
164118 Utah 140, 154, 221 P. 2d 857, 865 (1950). Emphasis added.)
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The case is remanded with instructions to determine and enter a deficiency judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed." (Emphasis
added.)
While the case was remanded with instructions to
enter a deficiency judgment, the Court expressly stated
that it was not placing its approval upon the formula employed by the Commission. Accordingly, the computation
of the depletion provision for 1942 remained to be made by
the Commission, and the formula and its application continued subject to judicial review.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that if Kennecott
files its return on an allocated basis, it must alloca·ce
"some" income to post mining activities. As noted above,
we have fully complied with this holding, and it is now incumbent upon the Commission to produce at least "some"
evidence to justify its attempt to subtract twice the post
mining income to arrive at the depletable base.

The 1950 Case.
We must confess, at the outset, that it is not altogether clear just what the 1950 case actually holds in respect to depletion. As indicated by the chart of com·
parative computations (5 Utah 2d at 310), it is clear that
Kennecott made no calculation to subtract post mining
income. Rather, Kennecott took the position that by using
the three part formula (not twice but just once), it
effectively eliminated post mining income. The court
clearly rejected this contention (5 Utah 2d at 319). On
this aspect of the case, we believe that the 1967 and 1968
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returns are rather easily distinguished since Kennecott
has made specific deductions for both years to eliminate
post mining income as well as allocating the same through
the uniform formula.
It is quite clear also that whatever else it may say,
the case does not hold that post mining profit is to be
determined in the manner here proposed by the Commission whereby it first deducts the specific figures utilized
by Kennecott in its returns, it then makes a further reduction by a factor of 66% and finally makes yet another
deduction by the same factor of 66%. (See, Exhibit "P".)

The case could be interpreted as saying that there is
a necessary relationship between allocated taxable income
and "net income from the property." (See, 5 Utah 2d at
319). Any such expression is, however, quite clearly tied
to specific facts which no longer exist. We quote from the
decision to exemplify this careful distinction which was
made by the court:
"Therefore, the devaluation of the mine, when related by statute to that income, must be based
upon the same formula for consistency's sake.
Under the formula, Kennecott allocates to Utah
approximately two-thirds of its net income as the
value of its franchise in this State. Since its entire
activities within this State are concerned with
mining this figure must represent the net income
from the mining property. One-third of this amount
is allowed as a depletion deduction to be claimed
from gross income in computing net income which
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is the basis for the allocation formula." (Emphasis
added.)

*

*

*

The problem here is to determine what the value
of the mine is in relation to the earning of net income, and the ceiling upon a 1/3 depletion allowance is set by the amount of income attributable
to this state where the only property concerned in
the computation is the mining property located
here and granted the allowance by statute." (Emphasis added.)
The court was quite careful to note that the relationship
between allocated income and depletable base only exists
when the "entire activities" of the corporation in the taxing state are "concerned with mining" and where "the only
property concerned in the computation is the mining property located here." If we might paraphrase the court, what
it is saying is that where the only activity in Utah is mining at the Bingham mine, then all expenses are "applicable to the property" (in the words of Regulation 12) and
all expenses deducted in the depletion computation are
also deducted in the net income for tax purposes computation.
We have already pointed out, hereinabove, that this
situation simply no longer exists. Kennecott has numerous operations in Utah which are not mining and which
are not "applicable to the property". Hence, the assumed
relationship between depletable base and allocated income
simply no longer exists for the same reason that it does
not exist with the clothing store and uranium mine.
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The disparity between the two concepts is even
greater when you consider Kennecott and its affiliates on
a consolidated basis (as we have argued for in POINT I),
or even Kennecott on a corporate apportionment basis excluding the subsidiaries. Referring back to Chart III at
page 17 supra, it will be noted that the net income allocated to Utah includes total consolidated net income (from
Kennecott, Chase, Peabody, Bear Creek, etc.) as allocated
according to the property, payroll and sales of all these
companies. It would only be by the sheerest coincidence
if the consolidated income allocated to Utah came out
the same as the computation of net income from the
property for depletion purposes.
If we may digress further to more basic concepts, the
comparison between depletable base and allocated income
is nothing more or less than a comparison between separate accounting and the formula. The courts and authorities agree that the two are not expected to be comparable
and that neither impeaches the other. If this be true, a
fortiorari, one would not expect that the two would be
equal.

Another way to test the reasonableness of a theory
is to apply it to other factual situations and see if it produces a valid result. Suppose, for example, that the Bingham mine operations were shut down for an entire year
because of a strike. Under these circumstances, there
would be no "net income from the property". Yet, there
would still be income allocated to Utah for tax purposes
under the uniform act since the consolidated group still
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has property, payroll and sales in the State. Could Ken.
nnecott successfully claim, under these circumstances
'
that it will pay no tax in Utah? The answer is demon·
strably no.
Finally, there is a basic distinction between the depletable base and allocated taxable income for franchise
tax purposes - the former is supposed to be an "income"
figure, whereas the latter is more a test of "business activity" as measured by property, payroll and sales. This
court in Western Contracting clearly discerned this distinction as follows:
"Subsection (6) of the above quoted statute does
not purport to tax directly a corporation doing
business both within and without the state on the
net income which may be credited by a system of
accounting to business done within the state.
Rather, it seeks to tax a percentage of the entire
net income, wherever it may be earned, by a formula of apportionment composed of three distinct
ratios and to attribute this portion to business carried on within this state. Justice Wolfe observed
in California Packing Co. v. State Tax Commission:
'Hence, the net income is always to be found, not
for a direct tax on it but to furnish the measure
for the imposition of a franchise tax.' "
For the reasons stated, the 1950 case is simply no
longer applicable to Kennecott and its affiliates. If the
court should find that the case does have extant viability,
we respectfully submit that it has been overruled by
Wes tern Contracting or should be forthrightly overruled
at this time.
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B. The Method Utilized by Taxpayer is in Strict
Compliance with the Law.
The Tax Commission offered no evidence whatsoever
to impeach the depletion computations as contained in
the taxpayer's returns. Moreover, the Commission itself
has adopted Kennecott figures, with the exception of a
relatively minor federal income tax deduction, in making
its own computation of depletion. (The principal difference being the double deduction of post mining income
by the Commission.) Therefore, no particular support is
needed for our computations except to add that the method
utilized by Kennecott in the Utah returns is essentially
identical to that used in the federal consolidated returns,
which method has been scrutinized and accepted by the
Internal Revenue Service.165 In view of the similarity between the Utah and federal statutes on depletion, we
submit that the acceptance of the method by the Internal
Revenue Service constitutes persuasive evidence of its
accuracy and compliance with the law.166
POINT VII.
THE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMISSION TO
ASSESS INTEREST AGAINST KENNECOTT
IS UNFAIR AND INEQUITABLE AND THE
FAILURE TO WAIVE SUCH INTEREST IS
AN ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION VESTED
IN THE COMMISSION BY STATUTE.
---::See Testimony of R. L. Ward, Tr. 102-07, Exhibits "F" and
"G".
I66Bennett Association v. Utah State Tax Commission, 19 Utah
2d 108, 426 P. 2d 812 (1967).
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It is respectfully submitted that the arguments under
the preceding points are dispositive of this case in Kennecott's favor. The following argument is made arguendo
only, and should not be considered as a retraction from
our basic position as set forth above.

In its Decision dated April 5, 1971, the State Tax
Commission ordered that interest be assessed against
Kennecott on the tax deficiencies found by the Commission as follows:
Taxable
Year

Tax Found
Due

Interest
Period

A:r:nount of
Interest

1967

$ 836,420.02

From April 15, 1968
to May 15, 1971

$154,737.70

1968

$1,175,442.22

From April 15, 1969
to May 15, 1971

$146,927.78

TOTAL INTEREST FOUND DUE

$301,665.48

In its Utah franchise tax retru-ns for 1967 and 1968,
Kennecott applied the three-part statutory formula 161 in
allocating its income to Utah. At the time of filing those
returns, Kennecott felt that the use of the three part
formula was required since it had no notice whatsoever
that any allocation method other than the three part forshould be applied. Indeed, the formula is mandatory
under both statute and regulation. 160 Likewise, in filing
a consolidated return, Kennecott and its affiliates were
merely exercising a clear statutory right. 169
CODE ANN. §59-13-86 (Supp. 1969).
CODE ANN. §59-13-87 (Supp. 1969), and Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation No. 8 (3).
169UTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-23 (1953).
167UTAH

1ssUTAH
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In its decision of April 5, 1971,110 the Commission determined that its own "formula", and not the three part
statutory formula, should be used to allocate Kennecott's
income to Utah. That deviation from the three part formula was undertaken pursuant to the relief provision of
the statute. 111 By using its own allocation "formula", the
Commission determined that there were tax deficiencies
in Kennecott's returns for 1967 and 1968 and that interest112 should accrue on those deficiencies from the due
dates of those returns until May 15, 1971. The decision also
involves a complete violation by the Commission of the
statute and regulation on consolidated returns. (See
POINT I.)
We submit that the imposition of interest in this case
is inequitable and unfair because the taxpayer has made
a good faith effort to determine the proper tax due under
the law, paid that tax in advance, and had no notice
of or opportunity to pay any additional taxes owed by it
until the determination for such additional taxes was
i10Decision No. 277.
mUTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-95 (Supp. 1969) allowed the
Commission to require a taxpayer to not use the three-part formula in
allocating income to Utah if it is found that:
" . . . the allocation and apportionment provisions of this Act
(UDITPA) do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's
business activity in this state...."
112UTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-28 (1953) provides that:
"Interest upon the amount determined as a deficiency shall be
assessed at the same time as the deficiency, shall be paid upon
notice and demand from the tax commission, and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of six percent per annwn
from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax to the date
the deficiency is assessed."
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made by the Commission on April 5, 1971. The "formula"
which the Commission is attempting to apply in this case
is so complex, illogical and bizarre that, prior to the Commission's decision, it would have been an utter impossibility for any mortal to foresee the use of that "formula"
as being required under the law. Therefore, we contend
that it is inequitable and a denial of procedural fairness
for the Commission not to give Kennecott prior notice of
any kind regarding the allocation method to be used in
1967 and 1968 and yet to assess interest against Kennecott for taxes found to be due upon application of the
Commission's own "formula" for those same periods.
When there is necessity for resort to litigation to
determine the validity of a tax, and particularly where
the taxing authorities are the moving parties of the litigation, or agree to submit the question to the decision of
the court, 113 the courts have refused to hold the taxpayer
liable for penalties and interest upon so much of the tax
as is finally determined to be valid against it. 114 This is
based upon the theory that the payment of taxes to which
the state may not be rightfully entitled should not be coerced under threat of penalty. 115
In Commonwealth v. Southern Pacific Co.,1 16 the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated that:
mTbe Salt Lake Tribune, May 29, 1970, at 38.
1HUnited States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U. S. 535, 46 L.Ed.
315, 22 S.Ct. 172 (1902).
175Jd.
11e169 Ky. 296, 183 S. W. 925 (1916).
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"The first proposition resolves itself into the question cf whether the taxpayer is delinquent until he
has had an opportunity to voluntarily pay his
taxes, and which have previously been definitely
fixed or the amount of which could have been by
him, appmximately ascertained before the penalty
attaches. In this case ... as long as the appeals
were pending in the quarterly court it was impossible for the Company to know what the final
amount of the assessment might be, and it would
have been nothing short of a reckless guess for it
to have undertaken to approximately fix the
amount of its taxes for any one of the years involved, so as to have tendered the same before
the interest and penalty attached.
. . . It follows from what we have said that the
statute could not have intended that the interest
and penalties should be exacted when the taxpayer
has had no opportunity to voluntarily pay his taxes
before they ordinarily attach under the terms."
In Commonwealth v. Bingham's Administrator,111 the
Kentucky Court also stated that:
". . . The law neither demands nor expects the
impossible, nor will a Court by its decree penalize
a person for the nonpayment of a tax, the amount
of which is not fully ascertained, but at .the present
time is still undetermined, and this through no
fault of the party sought to be charged."
... As said in State v. Certain Lands in RedU}ood
County 40 Minn. 512, 42 N.W. 473: 'A penalty for
the nor:payment of a tax cannot be imposed until
the person has an opportunity to pay it, and fails
to do so.'"
111187 Ky. 749, 220 S. W. 727, at 730 (1920).
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Courts have recognized that a taxpayer should not
be held liable for penalties or interest where the failure
to pay the tax was due to the taxpayer's contention, in
good faith, that it was not liable for the tax. 118 In applying this rule, the courts do not require as an element of
good faith that the taxpayer be upheld in his contention;
but if his insistence is frivolous, malicious, and unreasonable so as to be arbitrary and clearly show conduct not
prompted by good faith, it will be ineffective and of no
avail.119
The "good faith" rule should be applied in this case
to relieve Kennecott of interest assessed against it by the
Commission. Kennecott computed its taxes in good faith.
It filed its tax returns on time and paid its taxes one year
in advance for each of the years 1967 and 1968. Then,
when the auditing division of the Commission sought to
assess deficiencies and interest against it, Kennecott made
a bona fide and good faith effort to contest its liability
for such deficiencies and interest. Furthermore, its contentions have not been frivolous, malicious, unreasonable
or arbitrary. As noted in the preceding points, Kennecott's position is supported widely by authorities and by
competent and nationally recognized experts produced
by Kennecott at the hearing.
11sCommonwealth v. Cincinnati N.O. & P.T.R. Company, 288 Ky.
43, 155 S. W. 2d 460 (1941); Meyers v. Arcadia Realty Foundation,
Inc., Ky., 367 S. W. 2d 836 (1963); Parr v. City of Erlanger, Ky.,
438 s. w. 2d 785 (1969).
mparr v. City of Erlanger, Ky., 438 S. W. 2d 785 (1969).
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Equitable considerations may properly be examined
by a court in tax cases. 180 In United States Trust Co. v.
New Mexico, 181 the Supreme Court of the United States
stated:
"Until the amount of legal taxes was definitely
ascertained, the owners of this property had no
opportunity of paying such taxes, and therefore,
were not in default in not paying; hence, the claim
for back interest is not a valid one....
. . . [T]he owners of the road were therefore justified in contesting their liability to such assessment
in taxation in gross, and until there was an identification of the property subject to taxation and a
determination of the amount of taxes due, it would
be unequitable to charge penalties for nonpayment....
Viewing the proceedings from an equitable standpoint, we see no error in refusing interest prior to
the decree."
It is also clear that courts may, in the exercise of their

equitable powers, abate tax penalties under meritorious
conditions. 182 We submit that the conditions in this case
are meritorious on the part of the taxpayer, and that,
accordingly, the interest assessed by the Commission
should be abated.
We also submit that the failure of the Commission
to waive the interest on the tax deficiencies is an abuse_ of
1s0United Stwtes Trust Co.

Ct. 172, 46 L. Ed. 315 (1902).

v. New Mexico,

183 U. S. 535, 22 S.

181Jd.
182General Petroleum Corp. v. Smith, 62 Ariz. 239, 157 P. 2d 356

(1945).

150
the discretion vested in the Commission by statute. 1 83 In
its Conclusion of Law No. 25, the Commission concluded
that:
"There is no showing of undue hardship or other
valid reason which would properly justify this
Commission to waive or reduce the interest imposed by the statute on tax deficiencies detennined
herein."
We submit that the Commission was wrong in concluding
that there was no valid reason which would properly justify the waiving of interest in this case. The procedural
unfairness and the inequitable way in which the Commission deviated from the statutory allocation formula
are certainly two very valid reasons for waiving interest
on the deficiencies.
The legislative purpose in giving the Commission the
discretionary power to waive interest and penalties on tax
deficiencies was to allow the Commission to differentiate
between good faith compliance and willful wrongdoing
regarding the tax laws. It would seem that where a tax
deficiency was due to willful and conscious wrongdoing
on behalf of a taxpayer, the Commission would not be
authorized to waive interest and penalties, and if it did
so, such action would be an abuse of discretion within the
meaning of the statutory provisions. 184 By the same token,
i83The relevant statute, UTAH CODE ANN. §59-13-57 (1953) provides that:
"Upo11 making a record of its reasons therefor, the tax commission
shall have the power in its discretion, to waive or reduce any of
the penalties or
provided in this chapter or to compromise
the same."
184LJnited States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U. S. 535, 46 L.
Ed. 315, 22 S. Ct. 172 ( 1902).
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where a tax deficiency was not due to any willful or conscious wrongdoing but was due simply to an alleged misapplication or misconstruction of the tax laws, the Commission would be warranted and, indeed, obligated to
waive the interest on such deficiencies. Since there were
valid reasons for waiving the interest, the Commission
should have exercised its power under the statute.
It is stated in 51 AM. JUR., Taxation, section 978:

"Statutes providing for the remission or reduction
of penalties, interest charges, and costs imposed
upon delinquent taxpayers are liberally construed
in favor of the taxpayer. The grant to tax officers
of power to remit penalties for tax delinquencies
includes power to remit interest charges imposed
by statute in respect of delinquent taxes, such
charges being in the nature of penalties."
It is also stated in CORPUS JURIS, Taxation, section 2229

as follows:
"Statutes for remission of interest, being remedial
in character, should be liberally construed, and
extended to all cases fairly coming within the
reason or rule thereof; and although permissive
in form should be given a mandatory effect."
In State v. Coos County,1 85 the Supreme Court of
Oregon held:
"We are of the opinion that the words used, to-wit,
'the county courts of the several counties of the
state may and are hereby authorized to remit',
etc., when used in the connection in which they
appear in the act, should be construed as manda185115 Ore. 300, 237 P. 678 (1925).
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tory. While in form permissible, they are preemptory when used to clothe a public officer with the
power to do an act which ought to be done for the
sake of justice, or which concern the public interest
or the rights of third persons.... "
We submit that the legislature gave the Commission
the power to waive interest so that good faith compliance
with the statute upon the part of the taxpayer could be
recognized by the Commission and not penalized. Here,
there was good faith compliance by Kennecott. Therefore, the Commission should have waived the interest on
the deficiencies and its failure to do so was an abuse of
the discretion given to it by the legislature. Accordingly,
we ask this court to reverse the decision of the Commission and to remit the interest on the deficiencies.
CONCLUSION
While the length of the foregoing brief bears witness
to the complexities of this case, it is apparent that, tran·
scending the decimal points and dollars, the present case
involves major policy questions which, as ultimately re·
solved by this court, will have an impact far beyond these
current disputes and also far beyond the state boundaries
of Utah. So far as we are aware, this is the first case to
reach the highest court of a state involving an application
of the relief provisions of the U.D.I.T.P.A. Thus, beyond
the tax dollars here at issue (which though significant are
by no means apocalyptic), we are testing for the first time
some major premises which underpin our federal form of
government. Many leading authorities in the field have
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felt that the responsible actions of state legislatures in
adopting the Uniform Act will put an end to threatened
Congressional intervention. Others have stressed even the
need for uniform regulations for the Uniform Act to further hedge against a major disruption of state sovereignty
in this field. But the diligent labors of the draftsmen of
the act, the responsible and commendable action of the
state legislators including Utah's in enacting it, and the
poignant pleas of the authors for uniformity are all for
naught if the basic principles of the Act are to be sacrificed
at the altar of maximization of state revenues. At issue
here is the fundamental question of whether .the states
can exercise sufficient self-restraint to allay federal intervention. One can easily imagine the following colloquy
before the House Committee or the Judiciary Special
Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce:
CHAIRMAN: The chair will recognize the Representative from State X.
REPRESENTATIVE: Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. We have consistently deferred action in regulating state taxation on commerce because state taxing authorities have assured us that the Uniform Act would prevent the
type of inconsistency and inequity which we found
in the report in 1964. The trouble is that .the
Uniform Act is not working.
CHAIRMAN: I thought it was a well done act
which had been adopted in a majority of the states.
REPRESENTATIVE: It is, but the application
of .the Act has not been uniform. Take Utah,
example, a major mining company filed a consoli-
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dated return under the Uniform Act. The Tax
Commission found that the company and its affiliates were unitary. And then, the Tax Commission
proceeded to deviate completely from the Act and
tax the company some four times what the Act
would have allowed.
CHAIRMAN: Maybe there was some good reason for deviating.
REPRESENTATIVE: Not really. The company
is a very typical vertically and horizontally integrated mining company. California, in an earlier
case, held that this very same company was unitary and subject to tax on the .three factor formula.
The net result is that Utah is taking more than
its fair share.
As we see it, this Honorable Court has a uinque opportunity to set the pattern which will preclude the type of
colloquy set forth by infusing judicial strength to the
concept of uniformity which is essential to the success
of the Act.

* * * *
We are not unaware of a sentiment which has been
expressed to the effect that, since it is in Utah that
Kennecott operates its largest mines and since it is from
Utah that the valuable minerals are being extracted,
Kennecott should somehow be expected to pay a premium
tax. In answer to this concept (it being the thrust of the
Commission's decision which devotes endless verbiage to
superlatives about our size and national pre-eminence),
we note first that, as a matter of policy, Kennecott has
no objection to any non-discriminatory tax through which
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Kennecott pays its fair share. We note secondly that in
1969 Kennecott paid some 19.9 million dollars in state and
local taxes in Utah (205% of the 1960 figure), and we
project a figure of $31.7 million in Utah by 1972 (327%
of the 1960 figure) .186
Among the taxes paid is the mine occupation tax181
which this Court has held is a tax "on the privilege of
engaging in the business of mining, which privilege is the
taxable event." 188 The franchise tax, on the other hand, is
laid on the privilege of doing business generally. Thus, we
see no logic in the Tax Commission's theory that because
our mine is large and because we deplete the resources of
our mine in Utah, our franchise tax should be increased.
The franchise tax is neither aimed at nor measured by
tons of copper mined and sold-that is the function of
the occupation tax, under which we presently pay huge
sums of money far exceeding franchise taxes.
In any tax case, it is natural for the taxing authority
to promote the position which will increase revenue and,
likewise, for the taxpayer to do his best to reduce taxes.
One must, therefore, look to objective sources for the decisional criteria. Statutes, regulations, judicial precedents,
and the learned opinions of experts are the sources of
these guidelines. What we have attempted to point out
in the foregoing brief is that in every instance these
1

86Tr. 249.
CODE ANN. §59-5-66 et seq. (1953).

187UTAH

18BCombined Metal Reduction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 111

Utah 156 at 163 (concurring opinion) (1947).
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objective sources overwhelmingly support and indeed frequently compel the method employed by the taxpayer.
One will search, in vain, for any such support for the
Commission's approach.
For these reasons, we respectfully urge that the returns be upheld as filed and the Tax Commission's decision be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Calvin A. Behle
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Gordon L. Roberts
Roy B. Moore
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